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UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMIC 





 Although President Trump has persistently claimed that 
China is paying billions of dollars in tariffs imposed on Chinese 
imports to the United States, empirical evidence indicates that U.S. 
consumers are bearing the cost of the tariffs: $51 billion in increased 
prices and a net loss of $7.2 billion to the U.S. economy. The uni-
lateral power-based approach to trade used by the Trump Admin-
istration has also resulted in unexpected economic and political 
costs in key Midwestern states that helped propel Trump to the 
U.S. presidency in 2016. These costs have led to reverses for the 
Trump Administration in the mid-term elections of 2018 and could 
ensue in further electoral losses. 
 As both political parties currently hold little affection for 
China, the United States could continue to use tariffs against China 
and other countries as trade policy no matter which party controls 
the U.S. presidency. For these reasons, a study of how to most effec-
tively use a power-based approach to trade is both useful and timely. 
 This study indicates that a power-based approach can be 
used most effectively against countries that lack either the eco-
nomic power or the political will to engage the United States in a 
prolonged trade standoff. While most nations appear to fall into 
one or both of these categories, China is not one of them. China 
has the economic power to fight a trade war, and China believes 
it must stand up to the United States. When used against China, 
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the power-based approach carries greater risks because its eco-
nomic and political effects are difficult to predict and because 
this approach is inherently more uncertain than the cooperative 
approach of the World Trade Organization that the United States 
has rejected. Using a power-based approach against China could 
backfire because China has the economic power and political will 
to endure a prolonged battle and play a dangerous game of mu-
tual pain and destruction with the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION
 The Trump Administration has persistently boasted that the 
billions of dollars in punitive tariffs imposed on imported Chinese 
goods as part of the U.S.-China trade war begun in 2018 are being 
paid by China to the U.S. Treasury.1 For example, on February 14, 
2020, President Trump stated the following in his remarks to 
state governors: “China is paying us, right now, billions and bil-
lions of dollars of tariffs a month. Every month, billions of dollars. I 
love it. Personally, I love it. But they’re paying billions of dollars. 
And it’s hurting them; it’s not good for them.”2
Trump has made this bold claim repeatedly without offering 
any explanation or elaboration.3 Yet, this claim is inconsistent with 
orthodox economic theory, widely accepted by economists and trade 
lawyers alike, which holds that the consumers of the country impos-
ing the tariffs—the United States—bear the brunt of the tariffs.4
 Under the orthodox theory, a tariff is a tax on an import that 
must be paid before the import is allowed to exit the customs port 
of entry and enter into the internal market.5 The importer of record, 
1 Ben Werschkul, Trump Made This False Claim About China and Tariffs 
at Least 108 Times in 2019, YAHOO (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.yahoo.com/now 
/trump-has-made-this-false-claim-about-china-and-tariffs-at-least-100-times  
-182318319.html [https://perma.cc/UH2E-LGBM] (noting that Trump claimed 
at least 108 times in 2019 that China was paying for tariffs). 
2 Brooks Jackson, Does China Pay Tariffs?, FACTCHECK.ORG (Feb. 28, 
2019), https://www.factcheck.org/2019/02/does-china-pay-tariffs/ [https://perma 
.cc/3TFM-JUL3]. A more detailed breakdown of the tariffs is set forth below. 
See infra Part II. 
3 Trump has made this claim over 100 times. Werschkul, supra note 1. 
4 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW 201–02 (3d ed. 2017). Most observers reject this claim and assert that 
U.S. consumers are paying for the tariffs. See Jeanna Smialek & Ana Swanson, 
American Consumers, Not China, Are Paying for Trump’s Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/business/economy/trade 
-war-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/UYD9-4TVL]; Howard Schneider, Americans, 
Not Chinese, Pay Trump Tariffs: NY Fed Study, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-tariffs/americans-not-chinese-pay 
-trump-tariffs-ny-fed-study-idUSKBN1XZ2A4 [https://perma.cc/A633-MN4C]; 
Asher Stockler, New Study Confirms That Trump’s Claim About China Paying 
for Cost of U.S. Tariffs Is Untrue, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www 
.newsweek.com/trump-trade-war-china-tariffs-study-1453160 [https://perma 
.cc/NL2K-2PAR]. 
5 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 213. 
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a U.S. entity, must pay the tax (or post a bond).6 The exporter is 
not responsible for the tariff, which is normally the responsibility 
of the importer.7 The importer then normally passes on the cost of 
the tariff by including it in the price charged to the wholesale dis-
tributor or retailer of the goods.8 In turn, the distributor or re-
tailer then passes on the cost of the tariff to the consumer, the 
ultimate purchaser.9 Prices of like domestic products will also 
increase.10 Not only will high cost inefficient domestic producers 
raise prices but low cost efficient producers, who do not need the 
protection of the tariff, will also raise prices; the tariff acts as a 
subsidy to all domestic producers and the increase in domestic 
prices is an additional “tax” on consumers.11 The tariff can also 
6 Id. Most exporters and importers will hire a freight forwarder, a profes-
sional service provider, to handle the logistics of the export-importer transaction, 
including compliance with Customs. Jared Vineyard, What Does a Freight For-
warder Do & Do You Need One?, UNIVERSALCARGO (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www 
.universalcargo.com/what-does-a-freight-forwarder-do-do-you-need-one/ [https:// 
perma.cc/V373-5PKX]. On the export side, the freight forwarder handles the 
customs issues for the exporter and arranges for multimodal transportation, in-
cluding ocean carriage and inland transport (and insurance if required) of the 
goods from the nation of the exporter to the nation of the importer. Id. On the 
import side, the freight forwarder will file the paperwork for the importer with 
Customs and pay the tariff or post a bond. See id. The freight forward makes 
the initial tariff determination and calculation of the tariff. The final computa-
tion of the tariff, made by U.S. Customs authorities, is called “liquidation” and 
full payment of the tariff must be made before the goods are released. CHOW &
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 213. Computation can take several days or longer 
so most importers will file a summary entry form and post a bond as security 
for the tariff due that will allow the goods to be immediately released. See id.
7 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 213. 
8 Id. at 201–02, 213–14. 
9 Id.
10 See Howard Gleckman, What Is A Tariff and Who Pays It?, TAX POL’Y
CTR. (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/what-tariff-and 
-who-pays-it [https://perma.cc/9T67-LT8W]. 
11 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 201. Efficient producers are those 
low-cost producers that are not harmed by the imports due to superior technology 
or management. See Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A 
Critique of Piecemeal Accession, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 539, 552 (1995). They do not 
need the protection of the tariff and do not need to raise their prices because they 
are already profitable. See id. Only inefficient high cost producers need the protec-
tion of the tariff. See id. at 555. However, because the tariff on the imports and 
price increases by inefficient producers allow them to increase prices, most efficient 
producers will raise their prices in order to earn higher profits. See Gleckman, 
supra note 10. 
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have a negative impact on the country of the exporters as it reduces 
demand for their products; tariffs are a form of trade protectionism 
that protects domestic industry by limiting import competition.12
 The tariff that is collected by the Customs authorities is 
revenue for the U.S. government that is paid by the consumer, 
who ultimately bears the cost.13 The standard textbook result is 
that the gains to the U.S. government and domestic producers are 
less than the loss to consumers resulting in an overall deadweight 
loss to the U.S. economy.14 Although the tariff normally results 
in a deadweight loss, the tariff could have highly visible beneficial 
effects on the protected domestic industry, especially if it was in 
obvious financial distress.15
 Although this is an overview of how most economists view 
the costs of tariffs, this is a theory of rational human behavior 
that can, of course, vary in any particular case. If the tariff is a 
temporary measure, it is possible that the importer or the dis-
tributor might decide to absorb the cost of the tariff or pass on 
only a portion of the tariff to the consumer.16 This would mean that 
the importer or distributor would earn lower profits, but such a 
decision can be a rational one if the market conditions dictate, 
for example, that either no increase or only a small increase in 
price will be tolerated by consumers in the short term.17 It is also 
possible that the exporter will discount its prices, at least tem-
porarily, to the U.S. importer to help offset the price increases to 
the distributor or consumer.18 The exporter might also agree in 
the sales contract to reimburse the importer in part or whole for 
the tariff paid.19 At this point, the costs of the tariffs are shared 
12 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 202. 
13 Id. at 201. 
14 Id. For one view of the economic losses and the effect on GDP, see Erica 
York, Tracking the Impact of U.S. Tariffs and Retaliatory Actions, TAX FOUND.
(Feb. 14, 2020), https://taxfoundation.org/tariffs-trump-trade-war/ [https://perma 
.cc/A4GX-8AEX].
15 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 202. 
16 See Rajesh Kumar Singh, Explainer: Trump’s China Tariffs—Paid by 





19 See Century Importers, Inc. v. United States, 205 F.3d 1308, 1310 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (under sales contract, importer paid the tariff to clear customs but 
would later be reimbursed by exporter). 
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between the exporting nation and the importing nation.20 In all 
scenarios, a change in any of these variables will affect the ultimate 
costs of the tariffs and who bears them.21 Basic economic theory 
also does not account for any political effects of tariffs, such as on 
midterm U.S. elections in 2018.22 Only an in-depth empirical study 
of these variables can clarify which entity or entities bear the cost 
of the China tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration, the to-
tal amount of the costs, particular industries or groups bearing 
disproportionate costs, and the political effects of the tariffs. This 
Article sets forth the results of detailed empirical economic studies 
of the redistributive effects of the U.S. tariffs imposed on Chinese 
imports by the Trump Administration as part of the ongoing U.S.-
China trade war that began in 2018.23 The Article also examines 
the economic effects of the retaliatory tariffs imposed by China on 
U.S. imports.24 In addition, as the economic effects of tariffs often 
have political consequences, this Article also examines the polit-
ical effects of the China tariffs in post-2016 elections, including 
the midterm elections of 2018.25 This study is timely because the 
United States is likely to continue to use tariffs as a matter of trade 
policy against China and other countries, no matter which politi-
cal party controls the U.S. presidency.26 In setting forth this study, 
this Article emphasizes the following three major points. 
 First, the Trump Administration’s power-based approach to 
tariffs, which involves the unilateral imposition of punitive tariffs, 
often without legal justification, is most effective when the tar-
geted nation, as in the case of South Korea or the European Un-
ion, immediately capitulates and offers trade concessions.27 A 
20 See Singh, supra note 16. 
21 See Gleckman, supra note 10. 
22 See Robert Holleyman et al., 2018 Midterm Elections Update: Impact on 
U.S. Trade Policy, CROWELL MORING (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.cmtradelaw 
.com/2018/11/2018-midterm-elections-update-impact-on-u-s-trade-policy/ [https:// 
perma.cc/7S6L-2W3S]. 
23 See infra Part II. 
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 See William Mauldin & Siobhan Hughes, Broad Support for Trump’s 
China Fight Faces Test as Tariffs Escalate, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2019), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/broad-support-for-trumps-china-fight-faces-test-as-tar 
iffs-escalate-11557658801 [https://perma.cc/7PST-T7P6]. 
27 For a detailed discussion of South Korea and U.S. trade pressure, see in-
fra Conclusion. 
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power-based approach is less effective against a country like China, 
which for economic and political reasons, refuses to immediately 
make concessions to avoid punitive tariffs, but is willing to engage 
the United States in a prolonged standoff.28 In the case of the China 
tariffs, empirical analysis shows unequivocally that the cost of the 
tariffs has been passed almost entirely to the U.S. consumer, 
contrary to the assertion of the Trump Administration.29 In ad-
dition to imposing $51 billion in costs to U.S. consumers due to 
increased prices, the tariffs have resulted in a deadweight loss (or 
aggregate loss) of $7.3 billion to the U.S. economy.30 At the same 
time, China has also suffered economic losses as the tariffs have 
reduced demand for Chinese imports, leading to a contraction in 
China’s export driven economy for this same period.31 The China 
tariffs indicate that when the targeted country engages the United 
States in a standoff, the economies of both countries suffer mutual 
destruction by the unilaterally U.S. imposed tariffs.32 The country 
that concedes first and capitulates will be the country that is unable 
or unwilling to bear further economic harm.33 As the United States 
has the most powerful economy in the world, the United States may 
be able to use a power-based approach against many, if not most, 
other countries as these countries may lack the economic power or 
political will (or both) to engage the United States in a standoff.34
 Second, when the targeted country not only engages the 
United States in a prolonged standoff but also imposes retaliatory 
tariffs on the United States, the economic effects become even 
28 See Chad P. Bown, The 2018 US-China Trade Conflict After 40 Years of 
Special Protection 12 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 19-7, 
2019), https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/2018-us-china-trade 
-conflict-after-40-years-special-protection [https://perma.cc/CF8B-ATEJ].
29 See infra Section II.B. 
30 See id.
31 Kenneth Rapoza, Here Is How China Is Really ‘Paying’ for Tariffs, FORBES
(May 17, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/05/17/here-is-how 
-china-is-really-paying-for-tariffs/#11711b3a1fae [https://perma.cc/GQU4-DXFF]. 
32 See Bown, supra note 28, at 3. 
33 See Keith Bradsher, China’s Hard-Liners Win a Round in Trump’s Trade 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/14/busi 
ness/china-trade-hardliners.html [https://perma.cc/NE4B-SWUW]. 
34 See Daniel C.K. Chow, United States Unilateralism and the World 
Trade Organization, 37 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 26 (2019) [hereinafter United States 
Unilateralism]. 
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more unpredictable and uncertain.35 In the U.S.-China trade war, 
China has imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products 
to cause maximum pain and distress.36 U.S. agricultural exports, 
such as soybeans, are particularly vulnerable to retaliation as 
China buys about 50 percent of all U.S. soybean exports.37 Although 
the costs of the tariffs on U.S. agricultural imports will also be 
passed on to Chinese consumers, China has been able to avoid 
the bulk of these ill effects as China has met its demand through 
trade diversion, for example, by buying soybeans from other 
sources, such as Brazil and Argentina.38 The data indicate that 
significant volumes of trade in soybeans has been diverted from 
the United States mostly to Brazil and other countries.39 For the 
United States, the result of the China retaliatory tariffs on soy-
beans and other agricultural products is reduced demand for 
U.S. production.40 The reduction in U.S. exports to China has also 
caused additional economic harm that must be added to the eco-
nomic harm caused to U.S. consumers by the U.S. tariffs on 
Chinese imports.41 The additional harm from retaliation to the 
United States could tip the balance of harms in favor of the tar-
geted nation in some cases.42
 Third, the political effects of the tariffs and retaliatory 
tariffs of the U.S.-China trade war were also hard to predict at the 
start of the conflict.43 The data indicate that much of the eco-
nomic harm from both the U.S. imposed tariffs and the retaliatory 
tariffs has been concentrated in the Midwestern region of the 
United States that helped propel Trump to the presidency in the 
2016 election.44 The United States has attempted to offset some 
35 See infra Part II. 
36 See infra Section II.C. 




41 See Michael K. Adjemian et al., Tariff Retaliation Weakened the U.S. 
Soybean Basis, 34 CHOICES 1, 1–2 (2019), https://www.choicesmagazine.org 
/UserFiles/file/cmsarticle722.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ABD-8S9G]. 
42 See Stockler, supra note 4. 
43 See Jennifer Haberkorn & Tracy Wilkinson, Congress Debates Ways to 
Punish China over Virus, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2020, at A6, https://www.latimes 
.com/politics/story/2020-04-30/congress-looks-at-options-to-punish-china-over 
-the-corornavirus-outbreak (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). 
44 See infra Part II. 
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of these harms by providing subsidies, for example, financial pay-
ments, to U.S. farmers, but the subsidies have been unable to 
completely offset losses.45 The United States has also attempted to 
ameliorate the harm caused by China’s agricultural tariffs by 
extracting a commitment from China to purchase in 2020 and 
2021, respectively, $36.5 and $43.5 billion in U.S. agricultural 
products under the 2020 U.S.-China Trade Agreement (USCTA) 
reached on January 14, 2020.46 However, the data also indicate 
that it is unlikely that China will be able to fully meet these 
commitments and that the effects of the retaliatory tariffs will 
continue to burden key Midwestern states.47 These data indicate 
that the U.S.-instigated trade war with China may backfire on the 
Trump Administration by eroding support in states that voted 
for Trump in 2016.48 These data also indicate that the use of a 
power-based approach to trade is risky and can lead to unpre-
dictable and unintended consequences when the targeted nation 
has the political will and economic ability to engage in a pro-
longed standoff with the United States.49
45 See id.
46 See Dorcas Wong & Alexander Chipman Koty, The US-China Trade War: 
A Timeline, CHINA BRIEFING (May 13, 2020), https://www.china-briefing.com 
/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-timeline [https://perma.cc/25TD-SEA5]. The 
USCTA also suspended some of the U.S. tariffs and China also agreed to sus-
pend some tariffs on the United States. See id.; infra text accompanying notes 
83, 85. The effect of the USCTA is to suspend the U.S.-China trade war, at 
least in part. (Many of the tariffs on both sides still exist). Id. The official text 
of the USCTA is available at OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
ECONOMIC AND TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA (2020) [hereinafter USCTA], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agree 
ments/phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between 
_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf [https://perma.cc/WHW7-HJWL]. 
47 See Laura Reiley, China Could Purchase Much Less U.S. Farm Product 
Than Thought, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/business/2020/02/20/china-could-purchase-much-less-us-farm-product-than   
-thought-new-usda-estimate-suggests/ [https://perma.cc/9XRL-8XPV]; Phillipe 
Legrain, Why China Will Win the Trade War, FOREIGN POLICY (Apr. 13, 2018), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/13/why-china-will-win-the-trade-war/ [https:// 
perma.cc/MRA2-JECK]. 
48 See Pablo D. Fajgelbaum et al., The Return to Protectionism, 135 Q.J.
ECON. 1, 49 (2020).; see also infra Part II. 
49 See Matt Egan, It’s an Insane Time for Trump to Pick (Another) Fight 
with China, CNN (May 4, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/01/business 
/trump-china-coronavirus-trade-war/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZY3K-MK9B]. 
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 This study of the economic and political effects of a power-
based approach to trade is timely because although the Trump 
Administration was the first to use this approach with China, 
U.S. hostility towards China did not start with and will likely not 
end with President Trump.50 The current United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer, a well-known China 
and World Trade Organization (WTO) critic, and the chief archi-
tect of current U.S. trade policy, was approved by both houses of 
Congress by overwhelming majorities.51 Skepticism about China 
is one of the few issues that both political parties in Congress 
find common ground.52 Given the current hostile attitude to-
wards China in both political parties,53 the United States may 
continue to use a power-based approach to trade with China (as 
well as other countries) regardless of which political party wins 
the U.S. presidency. For these reasons, it is useful to evaluate 
the risks and utility associated with such an approach. 
 The limits of a power-based approach do not mean that it 
cannot be an effective strategy for the United States. Aside from 
questions of its legality under the WTO,54 the United States can 
use such an approach effectively if it first carefully analyzes the 
political and economic status of the targeted country as well as 
areas in which trade retaliation may occur.55 Our conclusion, based 
50 See Mauldin & Hughes, supra note 26. 
51 Roll Call Vote 115th Congress - 1st Session: On the Nomination (Con-
firmation Robert Lighthizer, of Florida, to be United States Trade Representa-
tive), U.S. SENATE (May 11, 2017), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll 
_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&session=1&vote=00127 [https:// 
perma.cc/L5F6-SPRM]; Andrew Restuccia & Megan Cassella, ‘Ideological Soul-
mates’: How a China Skeptic Sold Trump on a Trade War, POLITICO (Dec. 26, 
2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/26/trump-lighthizer-china-trade-war 
-1075221 [https://perma.cc/J599-MKDD]. 
52 Haberkorn & Wilkinson, supra note 43, at A6. 
53 Id.
54 Such an approach is inconsistent with the obligations of the United 
States under the WTO, although this issue does not seem to be much of a 
concern to the United States. See infra Section I.B. 
55 See Aaditya Mattoo & Robert W. Staiger, Trade Wars: What Do They 
Mean? Why Are They Happening Now? What Are the Costs?, 1, 6 (Nat’l Bureau 
Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25762, 2019), https://www.nber.org/system 
/files/working_papers/w25762/w25762.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM29-ZPA5]; see
also infra text accompanying note 154. 
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on the data, is that the power-based approach can be used most 
effectively against countries that lack the political will or eco-
nomic ability to engage the United States in a standoff.56 The 
power-based approach involves more risk when used against 
countries, such as China, that for political and economic reasons 
believes that it must stand up to the United States and engage 
the United States in a prolonged standoff.57 Against these types 
of countries, the power-based approach could lead to greater un-
certainty and less unpredictability in economic and political re-
sults, and could backfire.58 A careful study of the probable responses 
of the targeted country may reduce some of these uncertainties, 
but may not eliminate them entirely as a power-based approach 
involves many different variables and so is inherently less pre-
dictable than the cooperative approach, based on treaty negotia-
tion, that is the hallmark of trade under the WTO.59
 This Article will develop these main points by proceeding 
as follows. Part I will explain the background to the U.S.-China 
trade war and will explain in further detail how the tariff system 
of the United States works in practice. Part I will also examine 
the power-based approach of the United States used in defiance 
of its legal obligations under the WTO. A key component of this 
approach is that the United States has been able to disable the 
dispute settlement system of the WTO by paralyzing the WTO 
Appellate Body.60 The United States has installed a parallel sys-
tem of dispute resolution involving China’s USCTA and WTO 
obligations that is under the complete control and domination by 
the United States.61 Part II examines the empirical effects of the 
56 For examples involving the effective use of the power-based approach 
against South Korea and the European Union, see infra Conclusion. 
57 Ana Swanson & Keith Bradsher, U.S.-China Trade Standoff May Be In-
itial Skirmish in Broader Economic War, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2019), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/11/world/asia/us-china-trade-war.html [https://perma 
.cc/GJ52-HDMV]. 
58 See infra Part II. 
59 In contrast to a power-based approach favored by the United States, the 
WTO model of trade relations is based on multilateralism, negotiation, and 
consensus. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4. 
60 See Daniel C.K. Chow, A New and Controversial Approach to Dispute 
Resolution under the 2020 United States–China Trade Agreement, HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter New & Controversial Approach]. 
61 See id. at 22. 
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tariffs. The tariffs have resulted in some unexpected economic 
and political costs and may backfire.62 The Conclusion will give 
some policy recommendations based on the conclusions reached 
in Part II to help guide further U.S. tariff policy. 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE U.S.-CHINA TRADE WAR
A. The Trump Administration and Economic Nationalism 
 Although the United States has long been critical of China’s 
trade practices, U.S. policy reached a new level of assertiveness 
with the ascension of Donald J. Trump to the U.S. presidency in 
2016.63 A signature slogan of the Trump Administration during 
the election process was “America First,” a set of policies that echo 
economic nationalism from the 1930s, a period in which trade 
protectionism reached a peak that preceded the Second World 
War.64 Trump was able to exploit simmering resentment against 
China and the negative impact of trade effects that had been 
building up for years and that fueled a rising populism.65 His 
message that the United States was being exploited by China and 
other trading partners who reaped the major benefits of trade to 
the detriment of the United States resonated with a large segment 
of the electorate.66 Trump’s assertiveness against China and his 
call for a revival of economic nationalism was a key component of 
his election to the U.S. presidency.67
62 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48. 
63 See New & Controversial Approach, supra note 60, at 3–4. 
64 See Daniel C.K. Chow, Ian M. Sheldon, & William McGuire, The Revival 
of Economic Nationalism and the Global Trading System, 40 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2133, 2134–36 (2019). 
65 See Daniel C.K. Chow, William McGuire, & Ian M. Sheldon, A Legal and 
Economic Critique of President Trump’s China Trade Policies, 79 U. PITT. L.
REV. 205, 211, 213, 219–20 (2017).
66 CHATHAM HOUSE REPORT, AMERICA’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE UNDER DONALD 
TRUMP 1, 10–11, 19–20 (Xenia Wicket ed., 2017), https://www.chathamhouse 
.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-01-18-americas-international 
-role-trump-wickett-final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/74M4-LD6U]. 
67 See Luis Da Vinta, Competition, Conflict, and Conformity: Foreign Policy 
Making in the First Year of the Trump Presidency, 49 PRESIDENTIAL STUDS. Q. 
280, 280–81 (2019); Edward Alden, The Roots of Trump’s Trade Rage, POLITICO
(Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01 /the-roots-of 
-trumps-trade-rage-214639 [https://perma.cc/M7XD-5JEZ]. 
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 Although the United States has complaints against many 
trading partners, the United States singled out China for espe-
cially harsh criticism.68 The Trump Administration focused on the 
following problematic aspects of China’s trade policies: (1) unfair 
Chinese trade practices that increased the U.S. trade deficit with 
China to a record $420 billion in 2018;69 (2) state intervention in 
the internal market to favor China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
at the expense of U.S. companies;70 and (3) state policies that en-
couraged the theft of U.S. intellectual property and forced tech-
nology transfer.71 Trump also castigated prior U.S. administrations 
for weak policies that allowed China to exploit its trading rela-
tionship with the United States.72
 In following up on his campaign positions, Trump took 
aggressive measures to pressure U.S. trading partners into reorder-
ing their trading relationships with the United States.73 In 2018, 
the United States began to impose tariffs on a worldwide basis.74
On February 7, 2018, the United States imposed “global safeguard 
tariffs” by placing a 30 percent tariffs on all imports of solar panels 
worth $8.5 billion (except those from Canada) and a 20 percent 
tariff on all imports of washing machines worth $1.8 billion.75 On 
March 23, 2018, the United States imposed a tariff of 25 percent 
on all worldwide steel imports (except from Argentina, Australia, 
68 Simon Tisdall, Money Wars: How Sanctions and Tariffs Became Trump’s 
Big Guns, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/2018/aug/19/trump-money-wars-economic-sanctions-trade-tar 
iffs-backfiring [https://perma.cc/J6DJ-462S]. 
69 The People’s Republic of China, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTA-
TIVE, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-repub 
lic-china [https://perma.cc/S7XD-T2R5]. 
70 See Daniel C.K. Chow, The Myth of China’s Open Market Reforms and 
the World Trade Organization, 41 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 939, 948–51 (2020). 
71 Id.
72 Id. at 942–44. 
73 OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 TRADE POLICY AGENDA 
AND 2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 3, 6 (2018) [hereinafter USTR POLICY AGENDA
& ANNUAL REPORT], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/2018 
/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/59PL-6BLY]. 
74 Robin Levinson-King & Daniele Palumbo, Donald Trump v. The World: 
US Tariffs in Four Charts, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.bbc.com
/news/world-us-canada-45415861 [https://perma.cc/UWL5-6T8Z]. 
75 Wong & Koty, supra note 46. 
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Brazil, and South Korea) and a 10 percent tariff on all worldwide 
aluminum imports (except from Argentina and Australia).76
 The United States singled out China for especially draco-
nian treatment to pressure it into making trade concessions: In 
escalating fashion, the United States proposed “trade actions lists” 
of tariffs on selected Chinese goods of $34 billion (April 6, 2018),77
$16 billion (June 20, 2018),78 $200 billion (July 17, 2018),79 and 
$300 billion (May 17, 2019).80 In total, tariffs were to be imposed 
on $550 billion of imports or virtually all imports from China.81
In response, China imposed tariffs on $150 billion of imports from 
the United States.82 Subsequently, as a result of signing Phase I 
of the USCTA on January 14, 2020, the United States suspended 
or reduced tariffs on $300 billion of Chinese imports, leaving tariffs 
on $250 billion in place with further reductions linked to future 
agreement by China on Phase II of the USCTA.83 In exchange, 
under the USCTA, China agreed to purchase $200 billion in U.S. 
goods and services;84 China also agreed a proportionate reduc-
tion of its tariffs on U.S. goods.85
76 Id.
77 $34 Billion Trade Action (List 1), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301 
-china/34-billion-trade-action [https://perma.cc/G4JE-RYLT]. 
78 $16 Billion Trade Action (List 2), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTA-
TIVE, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/sec 
tion-301-china/16-billion-trade-action [https://perma.cc/CMQ8-Y5KU]. 
79 $200 Billion Trade Action (List 3), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301 
-china/200-billion-trade-action [https://perma.cc/J9UC-7F6A]. 
80 $300 Billion Trade Action (List 4), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/section-301-investigations/section-301 
-china/300-billion-trade-action [https://perma.cc/37L9-22L6]. 
81 USTR Statement on Section 301 Tariff Action Regarding China, OFF. OF 
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 23, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us 
/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/august/ustr-statement-section-301 
-tariff#:~:text=In [https://perma.cc/3NAS-NV7K]. 
82 BROCK R. WILLIAMS & KEIGH E. HAMMOND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45949,
U.S.-CHINA TARIFF ACTIONS BY THE NUMBERS, 1, 5 fig. 1 (2019), https://fas.org 
/sgp/crs/row/R45949.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RTQ-UTVD]. 
83 Wong & Koty, supra note 46. 
84 Id.
85 Id.
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 The Trump Administration’s aggressive use of trade sanc-
tions has been controversial on several fronts.86 Not only did the 
severity and scope of the sanctions shock U.S. trading partners, 
the sanctions were in breach of and inconsistent with the rules 
of the multilateral trading system established by the WTO and its 
predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
that have governed international trade for nearly seven decades.87
The United States’ response to claims of illegality under the WTO 
was to launch a decisive attack on the WTO and to assert a bold 
defiance of established WTO norms.88
B. Tariffs and Trade Under the WTO 
 The use of tariffs on imports is a component of the trade 
policy of most nations in the modern global economy.89 Each of 
the 164 member nations of the WTO use tariffs and has a tariff 
schedule that is filed with the WTO90 and is made part of annexes 
to the GATT, which regulates international trade in goods.91
86 Simon Tisdall, Money Wars: How Sanctions and Tariffs Became Trump’s 
Big Guns, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/2018/aug/19/trump-money-wars-economic-sanctions-trade-tariffs 
-backfiring [https://perma.cc/J6DJ-462S]. 
87 David J. Lynch, Trump’s China Tariffs Violate Global Trade Rules, WTO 
Says, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2020, 5:10 PM), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/business/2020/09/15/wto-trump-china-trade/ [https://perma.cc/MUE8-U4TK]. 
88 Adam Behsudi, Trump Ramps Up Attack Against WTO, POLITICO (July 26, 
2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/26/trump-world-trade-organiza 
tion-1623192 [https://perma.cc/P228-8Z96]. 
89 OECD, POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTMENT USER’S TOOLKIT 12 (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/policyareas/trade/PFItoolkitTRADE 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVE9-AFZQ]. 
90 An official publication of the WTO explains GATT/WTO schedules for 
goods and services. See What Is a WTO Schedule?, WTO, https://www.wto.org 
/english/news_e/news17_e/mark_27jul17_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGX4-TVG8]. 
The tariff schedule of each WTO members and other tariff information can be 
accessed from the official website on the member’s country page on the WTO 
website. For the United States, see United States of America and the WTO,
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/usa_e.htm [https://perma 
.cc/N7LH-MPX4]. 
91 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, art. I, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) 
[hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
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Each tariff schedule sets forth tariff rates for each imported 
product and it is possible to classify all products under these 
schedules.92 Goods are classified in accordance with the Interna-
tional Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description 
and Coding System of 1988, a unified system known as the 
Harmonized Convention.93 All WTO countries have adopted the 
Harmonized Convention;94 the United States adopted the Con-
vention as the basis for the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the 
United States (HTSUS).95 Once a good is classified in accordance 
with the HTSUS, then the tariff rate associated with that classi-
fication is applied.96 Under the HTSUS, the United States uses a 
10-digit system of classification.97 The tariff is determined at the 
8-digit level known as the “tariff line.”98 The 10-digit number is 
used for information gathering purposes and is not related to the 
92 For example, for China’s tariff schedules, see China’s goods schedules on 
China’s country webpage, China and the WTO, WTO, https://www.wto.org 
/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm [https://perma.cc/5XGT-LB8H]. 
93 See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSI-
NESS TRANSACTIONS 152–53 (4th ed. 2020) [hereinafter CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS].
94 Id. at 152. 
95 Id. at 153. 
96 Id. at 152. 
97 About Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.usitc.gov/tariff_affairs/about_hts.htm [https://perma.cc/EV4E-H9JJ]. 
The first two digits are the broadest category indicating a chapter. See CHOW 
& SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 93, at 
152. There are 99 chapters with the lower numbers indicating goods closer to 
nature and higher numbers indicating increasing complexity and industriali-
zation of the goods. Id. For example “04” indicates dairy products, such as 
eggs. Get Tariff Data, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tariffs_e/tar 
iff_data_e.htm [https://perma.cc/5XGT-LB8H]. The next two digits indicate a 
heading under the chapter, so “0403” refers to products derived from milk. Id.
The next two digits then indicate a subheading within the chapter and head-
ing, e.g., “040310” is the subheading for yoghurt. Id. At this point—the six-
digit line—this classification is uniform throughout all WTO countries. See
CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra note 
93, at 152. Beyond the six-digit number, national variations are allowed to 
occur. Get Tariff Data, supra. An example of an eight-digit line is “0403.10.11” 
(e.g., “low-fat yoghurt”). Id. This is the tariff line or the line at which the tariff 
is imposed. Id. The ten-digit line used by the United States is for information 
purposes only. See id. 
98 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, supra
note 93, at 153. 
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calculation of the amount of the tariff.99 Under the Harmonized 
Convention, all tariff classifications are uniform among WTO 
countries up to the 6-digit level;100 beyond that level, national 
variations are allowed to occur.101 As a result, a high level of in-
ternational uniformity and predictability in the use of tariffs has 
been achieved with the help of the WTO.102
 Goods imported from China and all other WTO members 
into the United States are subject to tariffs determined in ac-
cordance with the HTSUS.103 The HTSUS represents a bargain 
that the United States made with all other WTO members to apply 
the agreed upon (“bound”) rates and not higher rates.104 Under the 
WTO, like all other members, the United States is allowed to de-
part from its agreed upon tariffs in the HTSUS and to impose a 
higher tariff only under carefully circumscribed limits set forth in 
the GATT and other WTO agreements.105 For example, if the 
United States experiences a sudden and unexpected surge in 
imports from Country A, the United States could suffer harm to its 
domestic industries.106 If imports flood the internal market, prices 
will be driven downward and domestic manufacturers of products 
that compete with the imports could suffer financial losses.107 To 
allow these domestic companies some breathing room, the United 
States is allowed to use a “safeguard” and depart from its HTSUS 
tariff rate for the import.108 As a safeguard, the United States is 
allowed by the WTO to impose a higher tariff or to impose a quan-
titative limit or a quota on the imports on a temporary basis.109
Other examples that justify the imposition of a higher tariff is 
99 Id. at 153. 
100 Id. at 152. 
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 153. 
104 U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/callout/us-harmonized-tariff-schedule-hts 
[https://perma.cc/GUU5-E5FK]. 
105 Tariffs: More Binding and Closer to Zero, WTO, https://www.wto.org 
/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm2_e.htm [https://perma.cc/9R3P-AT3W].
106 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 399. 
107 Id.
108 19 U.S.C. § 2251. Agreement on Safeguards, WTO, https://www.wto.org 
/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm [https://perma.cc/3NRJ-P42B] 
109 19 U.S.C. § 1673. 
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an anti-dumping duty, which is an additional tariff to offset 
“dumped” imports, i.e., imports sold at artificially low prices to 
secure a foothold in the import market.110 An additional tariff, 
known as a countervailing duty, is also allowed when used to 
offset subsidies, i.e., financial contributions, made by the gov-
ernment of the exporter to allow the exporter to charge a lower 
price for its export and to gain an economic advantage over do-
mestic competitors in the import market.111 These types of tar-
iffs, called safeguards, anti-dumping duties, and countervailing 
duties, are the most common types of additional tariffs used in 
international trade that are justified departures from the tariff 
rates set forth in national schedules.112
 In the case of China, the United States imposed a wide-
ranging set of tariffs that did not fit into any of the categories of 
justified tariff increases discussed above.113 The United States 
justified most of the China tariffs through use of Section 301 of 
the Trade Act of 1974,114 which authorizes the United States to 
impose trade sanctions if an investigation determines that a 
country has violated its WTO obligations, has engaged in acts, 
policies, or practices that are unjustified, unreasonable, or dis-
criminatory and that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.115
 A problematic component of Section 301 is that it appears to 
authorize the United States to find a violation of another country’s 
110 See id.; CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 467–70. Anti-dumping 
duties are authorized by GATT Art. VI and the WTO Anti-Dumping Agree-
ment, Anti-Dumping Agreement (Implementation of Article VI of the GATT),
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/anti_dumping 
_e.htm [https://perma.cc/F7YU-SDY9]. 
111 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 467–68. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671. 
Countervailing duties are authorized by GATT Article VI and the WTO. See
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”), WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm [https://perma.cc
/F2ZS-6343]. 
112 See Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, etc., WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/ZM9B-RXYX]. 
113 Aaron Flaaen & Justin Pierce, Disentangling the Effects of the 2018–2019 
Tariffs on a Globally Connected U.S. Manufacturing Sector, FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2019086pap.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/RA2T-3ENG]. 
114 19 U.S.C. § 2411. 
115 Id.
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WTO obligations, which violates one of the most fundamental 
principles of the WTO.116 This is the basic principle that prohibits 
unilateralism.117 Only the WTO has the authority or jurisdiction 
to decide issues of WTO law;118 all WTO members must defer to, 
and base their actions on, the WTO’s determination of WTO law;119
if individual states could decide issues of WTO law on their own, 
then these actions would undermine the WTO and the WTO would 
become irrelevant.120
 Section 301 deals with the issue of unilateralism by provid-
ing that upon the initiation of a 301 investigation, the United 
States will file a parallel action in the dispute settlement system 
of the WTO.121 The two actions will proceed simultaneously with 
the United States’ action to be based on the result of the WTO 
case.122 The issue of whether this mechanism was sufficient to 
deal with the problem of unilateralism, was squarely raised by the 
EU before the WTO panel in United States—Sections 301–310 of the 
Trade Act of 1974.123 The EU argued that time deadlines under 
Section 301 could require a decision by the United States on issues 
116 See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 
1974, ¶¶ 2.2–3, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted on Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Trade Act of 1974], https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?file 
name=Q:/WT/DS/152R.pdf&Open=True [https://perma.cc/H7NB-SGR9]]. 
117 This principle is contained in Article 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, which provides in relevant part: 
Members shall ... not make a determination to the effect that 
a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or im-
paired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered 
agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dis-
pute settlement in accordance of the rules and procedures of 
this Understanding, and shall make any such determination 
consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate 
Body report adopted by the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] or 
an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding[.] 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, art. 23.2(a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
WTO, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1241 (1994) [hereinafter 
DSU]. For a discussion of the United States’ unilateralism, see United States 
Unilateralism, supra note 34. 
118 DSU, supra note 117, at 1241. 
119 Id. at 1241–42. 
120 See United States Unilateralism, supra note 34, at 30. 
121 See id. at 12. 
122 Id.
123 See Trade Act of 1974, supra note 116, ¶¶ 4.3, 7.112. 
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of WTO law before the WTO dispute settlement body could reach 
its decision.124 The WTO panel rejected this argument because it 
found that a U.S. administrative interpretation required the United 
States to wait for a decision by the WTO before the Section 301 
investigation could make any of its findings.125 Thus, Section 301 
was not in violation of the principle prohibiting unilateralism 
because any decisions of the United States on WTO law would 
be based on a prior ruling by the WTO.126
 Although the WTO provided clear direction on how Section 
301 can be applied consistent with the WTO, the United States 
has ignored this mandate in the U.S.-China trade war.127 For the 
past twenty years, the United States brought a parallel case in 
the WTO for every Section 301 investigation,128 but the Trump 
Administration never filed a WTO case in the Section 301 inves-
tigations leading to the China tariffs.129 Instead, the United States 
acted unilaterally and made findings under Section 301, includ-
ing findings that implicated issues of WTO law, which were not 
based on a prior WTO ruling.130 The United States then imposed 
trade sanctions on China based upon such Section 301 findings.131
These sanctions are in breach of the WTO principle prohibiting 
unilateralism and are without legal justification.132
C. Paralysis of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
 U.S. defiance of the WTO can be understood only by con-
sidering the events set in place by the United States leading up 
to December 10, 2019, when the WTO lurched into a crisis with the 
paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body.133 U.S. dissatisfaction with 
the WTO began almost immediately after the WTO’s inception on 
124 Id. ¶¶ 4.1–3, 7.29. 
125 Id. ¶¶7.112, 8.1. 
126 Id. ¶ 8.1. 
127 See id. ¶¶ 7.112, 8.1; United States Unilateralism, supra note 34, at 13. 
128 See United States Unilateralism, supra note 34, at 12. 
129 See id.
130 See Section 301 Investigation Fact Sheet, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP-
RESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2018 
/june/section-301-investigation-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/7R7M-6Z8H]. 
131 See id. 
132 See id; see DSU, supra note 117, art. 23.2(a). 
133 See Daniel C.K. Chow, U.S. Trade Infallibility and the World Trade Organi-
zation, 2020 MICH. ST. L. REV. 599, 600–01 [hereinafter U.S. Trade Infallibility].
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January 1, 1995.134 The United States’ criticism of the WTO focuses 
on three elements: (1) the “judicial activism” of the Appellate 
Body that exceeds its powers and results in creating new law; (2) 
WTO decisions that reject U.S. trade law remedies and require 
repeal of venerable U.S. trade statutes; and (3) various viola-
tions by the Appellate Body of its own rules and procedures.135
Debate continues to rage over the role of the Appellate Body, 
although most current attention focuses on how to resuscitate 
the Appellate Body and save the WTO.136
 The WTO decides cases through panels, which act as trial 
courts, and the Appellate Body, which acts as the high court of 
international trade.137 On May 12, 2016, President Barack Obama 
took the unprecedented step of blocking new appointments to the 
WTO Appellate Body to replace retiring panelists.138 The Trump 
Administration continued this policy of U.S. intransigence with 
the result that on December 10, 2019, the number of remaining ac-
tive panelists fell below the number needed to constitute a quorum 
in the Appellate Body.139 As a result, the Appellate Body was una-
ble to convene and hear appeals of cases from WTO panels.140
 Panel decisions that are not appealed are not affected by 
the paralysis of the Appellate Body.141 Panel decisions that are 
appealed, however, are launched into a legal limbo.142 The Ap-
pellate Body is unable to convene to hear the appeal and the rules 
of the WTO make clear that once an appeal is filed, the WTO de-
cision cannot take legal effect until the appeal is completed.143
134 Id. at 4. 
135 Id. at 19–26. 
136 Id. at 9–13. 
137 Id. at 6. 
138 Id. at 8. 
139 Id.
140 What’s Next for the WTO?, COUNC. ON FOREIGN RELS. (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whats-next-wto [https://perma.cc/3NZX-2ZUP]. 
141 U.S. Trade Infallibility, supra note 133, at 8. 
142 Id.
143 Article 16.4 of the DSU states in relevant part: “If a party has notified 
its decision to appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered for 
adoption by the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] until after completion of the 
appeal.” DSU, supra note 117, art. 16.4. A panel or Appellate Body decision 
becomes effective when it has been adopted by the DSB, which consists of the 
entire membership of the WTO. See U.S. Trade Infallibility, supra note 133, 
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As it is now impossible to complete the appeal, any decisions that 
are appealed, are suspended indefinitely and have no legal effect.144
 The most important consequence of the crippling of the 
Appellate Body is that WTO obligations have become in effect 
unenforceable.145 For example, suppose that China wishes to con-
test a U.S. tariff imposed in defiance of the WTO. If China wins 
a decision against the United States from a WTO panel, the United 
States can simply file an appeal and suspend the decision indefi-
nitely, making it unenforceable.146
 One month after the paralysis of the WTO, the United 
States and China entered into the USCTA on January 15, 2020, 
which completed the United States’ plan to seize power over dis-
pute resolution, involving China, from the WTO.147 Under the 
USCTA, the United States has created a parallel dispute resolu-
tion system, one that is under complete U.S. control and domi-
nation, which can be used by the United States to unilaterally 
impose sanctions to resolve both USCTA and WTO obligations 
involving China.148
at 6. Under the principle of reverse consensus, the DSB must adopt the deci-
sion unless a consensus of all members decide not to adopt it. Id. Thus, so 
long as one member votes to adopt, the decision must be adopted. In practice, 
this means that it is highly likely that all WTO panel or Appellate Body deci-
sions will be adopted by the DSB. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 
84. However, adoption cannot occur so long as an appeal is still pending. 
144 See U.S. Trade Infallibility, supra note 133, at 8. 
145 Id. at 2–3. 
146 See id. at 3.
147 See New & Controversial Approach, supra note 60, at 1–2. 
148 Article 7.4 of the USCTA creates a unilateral dispute resolution mech-
anism that allows the United States to impose sanctions against China if 
China fails to agree to U.S. trade demands under the USCTA and the WTO. 
For a development of this argument, see New & Controversial Approach, su-
pra note 60, at 1 (explaining that the United States had a three part strategy: 
first, cripple the WTO dispute settlement system; second, engage in WTO 
inconsistent behavior that can no longer be challenged by pressuring China 
to purchase $200 billion in U.S. goods and services; and third, create a paral-
lel dispute resolution system over USCTA and WTO disputes that are under 
the USCTA which authorizes unilateral U.S. actions against China). Article 
7.4 of the USCTA creates a unilateral dispute resolution mechanism that al-
lows the United States to impose sanctions against China if China fails to 
agree to U.S. trade demands under the USCTA and the WTO. See USCTA, 
supra note 46, art. 7.4(1), (4)(b). 
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D. The U.S. Power-Based Approach to International Trade 
 This discussion of the background to the U.S.-China trade 
war illustrates the main strategic positions taken by the United 
States as part of its power-based approach to international trade. 
First, cripple the WTO dispute settlement system so that WTO 
obligations become unenforceable.149 Second, impose unilateral 
trade sanctions on U.S. trading partners in defiance of WTO law 
that can no longer be challenged due to the paralysis of the Ap-
pellate Body.150 Third, create a parallel dispute settlement sys-
tem in a bilateral treaty, which is under the complete control of 
the United States.151 With this strategy in place, the United 
States can use unilateral sanctions to pressure China and other 
U.S. trading partners into making trade concessions and to re-
order trading relationships with the United States, established 
under prior U.S. administrations.152 While the United States 
has been able to successfully create the legal conditions to allow 
the United States to pursue its power-based approach, the next 
part of this Article examines whether the power-based approach 
has been able to achieve the economic and political results sought 
by the United States. 
II. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE 
U.S.-CHINA TRADE WAR
A. Power-Based Bargaining and Tariffs 
 Analysis of President Trump’s trade policy choices has typi-
cally interpreted them in terms of a zero-sum game, i.e., rather 
than generating mutual benefits in a positive-sum game, inter-
national trade is a game where economically, one country is a 
winner while the other must be a loser.153 However, trade econ-
omists Aaditya Mattoo and Robert Staiger offer an alternative 
149 See New & Controversial Approach, supra note 60, at 1. 
150 Id.
151 Id. These arguments are developed in U.S. Trade Infallibility, supra
note 133, at 14–26. 
152 U.S. Trade Infallibility, supra note 133, at 27. 
153 See Daniel C.K. Chow & Ian Sheldon, Is Strict Reciprocity Required for 
Fair Trade?, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 33–38 (2019). 
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explanation for these actions: the Trump administration has cho-
sen to move from “rules-based” to “power-based” bargaining over 
tariffs as a means of dealing with what they call “latecomers” to 
the GATT/WTO.154 The concern here is that by switching from 
rules-based to power-based bargaining, the United States is putting 
the future of the post-war trading system at risk, as well as in-
flicting economic costs on both itself and its trading partners.155
 Key to the functioning of the GATT/WTO has been the most 
favored nation (MFN) principle and reciprocity, both acting as a 
constraint on exercise of bargaining power by a powerful country 
such as the United States.156 Specifically, MFN dilutes bargaining 
power by ensuring that tariff commitments to either one country 
or a subset of countries in the GATT/WTO are then offered to all 
other countries in the GATT/WTO, and at the same time, reci-
procity establishes the idea that there will be a balance of tariff 
concessions in any negotiating round of the GATT/WTO.157 By 
committing to such a set of rules, the United States has helped 
induce other weaker/smaller countries to successively lower their 
tariffs under the GATT/WTO.158
 In 2017, the United States’ average MFN tariff was 3.4 
percent compared to China’s average MFN tariff of 9.6 percent.159
Given this asymmetry in average bound tariffs, the current ad-
ministration perceived that it had little left to offer a latecomer 
to the WTO, such as China, in terms of reciprocity, and instead 
it has resorted to unilaterally raising its tariffs as a means to 
inducing China to cut its tariffs.160 However, in switching to uni-
lateralism, the United States is following a “myopic logic”, i.e., 
154 See Mattoo & Staiger, supra note 55, at 1–2, 5. 
155 See id. at 1. 
156 See id. at 1–2. The Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle is enshrined 
in GATT, Article I. GATT 1994, supra note 91, art. I. The MFN principle pro-
vides that any advantage given to any other country must be immediately 
and unconditionally given to all GATT/WTO members. Id. For example, if the 
United States gives the benefit of a low tariff to any country, the United States 
must immediately and unconditionally extend the same low tariff to all WTO 
members. The MFN universalizes trade benefits and is an inducement to join 
the GATT/WTO. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 4, at 150. 
157 See Mattoo & Staiger, supra note 55, at 2. 
158 See id. at 8. 
159 See Bown, supra note 28, at 30 tbl.4. 
160 See United States Unilateralism, supra note 34, at 21. 
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by using bargaining tariffs, the United States seems to have ig-
nored the real possibility that other countries, such as China, would 
likely resort to the same strategy, thereby undermining the mul-
tilateral trading system.161
 U.S. strategy ignores the basic principles of game theory, 
and the economic argument for why the GATT/WTO has, until 
now, been largely successful in its promotion and governance of 
international trade.162 The underlying logic of the GATT/WTO 
has been explained by trade economists in terms of the resolu-
tion to a prisoner’s dilemma.163 Imagine a non-cooperative world 
where the strategic choice of one country is to maximize its own 
objective function through tariff policy, given the tariff policy of 
the other country(ies). To understand its strategic choices, it is 
important to think through the economic effects of a tariff and 
why any country would rationally choose to apply one.164
 Assuming exporters do not adjust their price, an import 
tariff has the following effects: it raises the domestic price of the 
good being imported, but it also generates tariff revenue on that 
good.165 Once the transfer of revenue to the domestic exchequer 
has been accounted for, the net effect of the tariff generates what 
economists denote as a “deadweight loss,” i.e., there is a reduc-
tion in domestic consumers’ real income, with redistribution to 
both import-competing firms and the government.166 In other 
words, the incidence of the tariff is borne entirely by consumers 
of the imported good, thereby reducing domestic economic wel-
fare.167 The rationale for a country to follow a strategy that fails 
to maximize national income can only be political, i.e., governments 
adopt protectionist policies for electoral reasons.168 For example, 
protectionist policies can be chosen to target either sector-specific 
161 See id.
162 See Chow & Sheldon, supra note 153, at 4–5. 
163 See generally Prisoner’s Dilemma, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https:// 
seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/prisoner-dilemma/ [https://perma.cc/958Z-LPXW]. 
164 Mary Amiti et al., The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare,
33 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 187, 189–91 (2019). 
165 Id. at 189. 
166 See id. at 189–90. 
167 See id. 
168 See Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, A Protectionist Bias in 
Majoritarian Politics, 120 Q.J. ECON. 1239, 1243 (2005).
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lobby groups who provide campaign contributions to political 
parties or specific voter groups who are close to being indifferent 
between candidates.169
 However, if exporting firms do reduce their prices in re-
sponse to the tariff, there will be a terms-of-trade benefit to the 
importing country, captured in the form of additional tariff rev-
enue.170 In this case, the incidence of the tariff is partially borne 
by exporting firms, and it is quite possible for the terms-of-trade 
gain to outweigh the deadweight loss of the tariff, domestic eco-
nomic welfare increasing.171 The optimal import tariff, and hence 
the extent of the terms-of-trade gain, will depend on the slope of 
the export supply function, i.e., what economists define as the 
price elasticity of supply, which measures the rate at which firms 
change their supply in response to a change in prices.172
 Essentially, the tariff game has the structure of a prisoner’s 
dilemma: in the absence of cooperation, both countries, in choos-
ing to maximize their payoffs, have a unilateral incentive to uti-
lize a tariff, whatever the strategic choice of the other country.173
Each country seeks to improve its terms-of-trade, knowing that 
the other country will rationally adopt that same strategy, the 
outcome being a Nash equilibrium where neither country can 
unilaterally change its tariff strategy and be better off.174 The 
net result is that each country loses market access to the other 
country’s market because of tariffs, the reduction in the volume 
of international trade being economically inefficient.175
 The latter result suggests that it would be Pareto-improving 
for countries to agree to reduce their tariffs, and in the absence 
of a binding bilateral agreement between countries, the GATT/WTO 
169 See id. at 1239–41; Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection
for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833, 834 (1994) [hereinafter Protection for Sale].
170 See Amiti et. al, supra note 164, at 189. 
171 See id.
172 See Christian Broda et al., Optimal Tariffs and Market Power, 98 AM.
ECON. REV. 2032, 2032–34 (2008). 
173 See Ben Zissimos, The GATT and Gradualism, 71 J. INT’L ECON. 410, 
415 (2007). 
174 See id. at 413. The Nash Equilibrium, considered one of the great break-
throughs in the history of social science, is named after Princeton University 
mathematician John Nash. See Roger B. Myerson, Nash Equilibrium and the 
History of Economic Theory, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1067, 1069–70 (1999). 
175 See Zissimos, supra note 173, at 411. 
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has essentially neutralized the terms-of-trade incentive for coun-
tries to raise tariffs.176 In other words, if terms-of-trade effects 
have been removed from any country’s objective function, it will 
set tariffs to satisfy domestic political objectives alone.177 These 
would be either zero if a country seeks to maximize its national 
income through free trade or they would be positive in order to 
satisfy domestic political constraints, but, importantly, they are 
lower than those in a non-cooperative game.178 Therefore, if 
countries enter into a trade agreement, they will seek mutual re-
ductions in tariffs generating an increase in national and global 
economic welfare. 
 The lower tariff equilibrium under GATT/WTO has also 
been supported by a credible enforcement mechanism embodied 
in the dispute settlement process.179 Standard game theory sug-
gests that countries would have an incentive to deviate from a low-
tariff equilibrium.180 However, in a repeated game, the punishment 
for not adhering to a trade agreement is reversion to the static 
Nash equilibrium of high tariffs, i.e., what game theorists term a 
trigger strategy.181 In practice, the rules of GATT/WTO seek to 
maintain the balance of tariff concessions and avoid the use of 
punitive, and therefore economically destructive, actions.182 Es-
sentially, if one country were to raise its tariff, this would imply 
a loss of previously negotiated market access for the foreign 
country.183 Assuming that this action is not “abusive” under 
GATT/WTO rules, the other country can withdraw an equivalent 
amount of market access, a punishment path that is subgame 
perfect.184 However, if a country deviates in an “abusive” manner, 
there is reversion to the trigger strategy, i.e., there is an indefinite 
suspension of GATT/WTO obligations, both countries setting Nash 
176 See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, An Economic Theory of GATT,
89 AM. ECON. REV. 215, 226–27 (1999). 
177 See id. at 222–23. 
178 See id. at 222–24. 
179 See Zissimos, supra note 173, at 426. 
180 See id. at 411. 
181 See id. at 413. 
182 See ROBERT W. STAIGER, INTERNATIONAL RULES AND INSTITUTIONS FOR 
TRADE POLICY 1501 (Gene M. Grossman & Kenneth Rogoff eds., 1995). 
183 See Zissimos, supra note 173, at 416. 
184 See id. at 412. 
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equilibrium tariffs.185 In other words, the objective of GATT/WTO 
rules is to ensure that retaliation by one country against the 
unilateral action of another is proportionate, thereby minimizing 
the chance of a trade war.186
 By unilaterally raising tariffs to such an extent in 2018, 
an action that was clearly “abusive,” the United States simply 
provoked a trigger strategy reaction on the part of China.187 In-
stead of cutting its tariffs in response to the U.S. raising tariffs, 
China (and other countries) retaliated in kind by raising tariffs 
against the U.S., their average tariff reaching 18.3 percent by 
2018,188 and while the two countries did halt escalation of the 
trade war in early 2020 through Phase 1 of the USCTA, neither 
side has actually reduced tariffs to their pre-2018 levels.189 Es-
sentially, power-based bargaining by the U.S. has failed in the 
sense that the bilateral relationship with China has been pushed 
closer towards the higher tariff, non-cooperative Nash equilibri-
um, thereby putting the multilateral trading system at risk.190
B. The Economic Costs of Power-Based Bargaining 
 Given this substantive breach of the multilateral trading 
system, it is logical to ask: at what cost? Essentially, the U.S.-
China trade war represents a natural experiment in the sense 
that we have not seen such wide-ranging increases in tariffs 
since the 1930s, when Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act.191 Not surprisingly, applied trade economists have already 
conducted in-depth research on the impact of the trade war on 
the U.S. economy, the most notable being those by Mary Amiti, 
185 See id. at 416. 
186 See id. at 427. 
187 See Chad P. Bown, US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.piie.com/research 
/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart [https://perma.cc/PW4S-FPX6]. 
188 See id.
189 See id. 
190 See Mattoo & Staiger, supra note 55, at 1. 
191 See Chad P. Bown & Eva (Yiwen) Zhang, Trump’s 2019 Protection 
Could Push China Back to Smoot-Hawley Tariff Levels, PETERSON INST. FOR 
INT’L ECON. (May 14, 2019), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment 
-policy-watch/trumps-2019-protection-could-push-china-back-smoot-hawley 
[https://perma.cc/7M4B-WN5K]. 
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Stephen Redding, and David Weinstein; Alberto Cavallo et al.;
and Pablo Fajgelbaum et al.192
 Of the studies cited, the latter is perhaps the most de-
tailed. The authors constructed a monthly panel data set using 
publicly available tariff schedules issued by the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission (USITC) along with U.S. import and 
export data published by the U.S. Census Bureau, where the 
tariff data are defined at the 8-digit level of the HTSUS, and the 
import data are defined at the HTSUS-10-digit level.193 In addi-
tion, data on retaliatory tariffs were collected from the Ministry 
of Finance for China, the Department of Finance of Canada, the 
Office of the President of Mexico, and the WTO (covering the EU, 
Russia, and Turkey), tariffs being measured by China at the 6-
digit level of the Harmonized Convention.194
 During 2018, U.S. tariffs were targeted at 12,043 specific 
products at the HTSUS-10-digit level, where in 2017, these im-
ports were valued at $303 billion, accounting for 12.7 percent of 
total U.S. imports.195 The average ad valorem tariff increased 
from 2.6 to 16.6 percent.196 In terms of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. 
exports by Canada, China, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, and the EU, 
those accounted for $127 billion of U.S. exports, 8.2 percent of 
total exports, covering 8,073 products.197
 It is very clear from the data that the U.S. tariffs were 
mostly targeted at China, and Chinese retaliatory tariffs against 
the U.S. dominate, supporting the contention that the trade war 
is essentially between these two countries.198 In 2018, the U.S. 
targeted 11,207 products accounting for 49 percent of total im-
ports from China, tariffs increased on average from 3.0 to 15.5 
192 See Amiti et al., supra note 164, at 188; Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 
48, at 1; see generally Alberto Cavallo et al., Tariff Passthrough at the Border 
and at the Store: Evidence from US Trade Policy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., 
Working Paper No. 26396, 2019), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/CGNT_0 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW2R-6WMP]. 
193 For a discussion of the Harmonized System, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 90–111. 
194 Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 7. This is due to HTSUS-8 codes 
not being directly comparable across countries. 
195 See id. at 8. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. at 8–9. 
198 See id. 
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percent; while China targeted 7,474 products, tariffs increased 
on average from 8.4 to 18.9 percent.199 The data also show that 
the most protected U.S. sectors were primary metals, machinery, 
computer products, and electrical equipment and appliances, while 
U.S. trading partners targeted different products, most notably 
agricultural imports.200
 Interestingly though, there was not much variation in tar-
iff rate changes across sectors in either the United States or the 
retaliating countries.201 Almost all U.S. imports were targeted 
with either 10 or 25 percent tariff changes, and likewise for re-
taliatory tariff increases.202 This has two important implications: 
first, if either side in the trade war were seeking to maximize terms-
of-trade effects, tariff changes would likely vary across sectors 
depending on the price elasticity of supply;203 and, second, the 
lack of variation in U.S. tariff increases point to them not being 
driven by sector-specific lobbying.204
 Given their monthly panel data set, Fajgelbaum et al. un-
dertook a detailed empirical analysis of the effects of the trade war 
on the U.S. economy.205 They conducted an “event” study which con-
sisted of comparing targeted and non-targeted U.S. imports and 
exports.206 In the case of imports, the results indicate their value 
and quantity declined by 20 and 23 percent, respectively.207 Im-
portantly, they also present initial evidence that the incidence of 
U.S. import tariffs was borne entirely by U.S. consumers, tariff-
inclusive unit values of imports increased significantly as com-
pared to before-tariff unit values which did not change.208 These 
authors also found a similar pattern in the case of exports, where 
their value and quantity fell by 24 and 25 percent, respectively, 
199 See id. at 9. 
200 See id. at 9–13. 
201 See id. at 11–13. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. at 13. Formally, the less sensitive firms are to price changes, the 
higher the optimal tariff. 
204 See id. at 14. 
205 See id. at 7, 52. 
206 See id. at 14. 
207 See id. at 15; see also Amiti et al., supra note 164, at 195. They find in 
their analysis that the value of U.S. imports fell by 25 to 30 percent after im-
position of the tariffs. Id. 
208 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 15. 
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with no change in their before-tariff unit values, i.e., there was com-
plete passthrough of retaliatory tariffs to foreign consumers.209
 Fajgelbaum et al. also used econometric methods to eval-
uate the impact of tariff increases on U.S. import demand and 
foreign export supply.210 Their results, which are statistically 
significant, show that both the value and quantity of U.S. imports 
declined in response to the application of tariffs, Amiti, Redding, 
and Weinstein found similar effects in their study.211 However, 
Fajgelbaum et al. also found that there was no impact of U.S. 
tariffs on before-tariff unit values.212 The latter result provides 
further support for the argument that there was complete pass-
through of the tariffs to tariff-inclusive prices borne by U.S. con-
sumers.213 Similar results are reported for the impact of retaliatory 
tariffs on U.S. exports—there were significant declines in both 
the value and quantity of exports, but there was no reduction in 
before-tariff unit values by U.S. exporters.214 By contrast, Cavallo 
et al. (2019) found that there was imperfect passthrough of these 
tariffs to Chinese import prices of agricultural products.215
 The finding that incidence of U.S. tariffs was almost en-
tirely borne by U.S. consumers is consistent with the results of other 
studies using different estimation methodologies.216 It is also a 
surprising result given the importance placed on the terms-of-
trade argument in the international economic analysis of optimal 
tariffs, as well as the empirical literature that has found less than 
complete passthrough of exchange rate shocks.217 Over a longer 
time period, it might be expected that exporters would eventually 
cut before-tariff prices, especially if there was resolution of ex-
porter uncertainty about how long the tariffs will remain in place.218
Interestingly, a follow-up study with additional data for 2019, 
209 See id. at 16. 
210 See id. at 25–26. 
211 See id. at 26; Amiti et al., supra note 164, at 198–99. 
212 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 26–27. 
213 See id.
214 See id. at 31. 
215 See Cavallo et al., supra note 192, at 29–30. 
216 See Amiti et al., supra note 164, at 198–99; Cavallo et al., supra note 
192, at 1. 
217 See Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg et al., Goods Prices and Exchange 
Rates: What Have We Learned?, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1243, 1244 (1997). 
218 See Amiti et al., supra note 164, at 198. 
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shows that there is some variation across sectors, e.g., U.S. tariffs 
led foreign steel exporters to lower their before-tariff prices.219
 The final step in the analysis of Fajgelbaum et al. was to 
quantify the effects of the trade war in 2018 using a computable 
general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy calibrated at the 
county level.220 Their results were as follows: first, U.S. consumers 
of imported goods in aggregate lost $51 billion due to higher prices; 
second, U.S. exporters saw an increase in their income of $9.4 
billion; and third, U.S. tariff revenue totaled $34.3 billion.221
Therefore, the net effect of the trade war was an aggregate loss 
of U.S. real income of $7.2 billion, which can be thought of as an 
approximation of the deadweight loss referred to earlier.222 The 
latter number compares to Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein’s es-
timated net real income loss of $8.2 billion.223 As is often the case in 
applied trade analysis, the net economic effects are relatively 
small, but the re-distributional impact of tariffs on consumers is 
substantial.224 Other research by Michael Waugh suggests that 
subsequently this had a significant impact on consumption be-
havior, measured by reductions in county-level automobile sales.225
 Importantly, contrary to what President Trump has claimed, 
the results reported in Fajgelbaum et al., and in similar studies 
clearly show that the incidence of import tariffs implemented in 
2018 was entirely borne by U.S. consumers, any terms-of-trade 
effects on the import side being insignificant.226 Also, if there 
had been no retaliation by China and other countries, there 
would have been a modest U.S. real income gain of $0.5 billion 
in 2018 due to significant terms-of-trade effects on the export 
219 See Mary Amiti et. al, Who’s Paying for the US Tariffs? A Longer-Term 
Perspective 5 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26610, 2020), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w26610/w26610.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/AJ43-XPDT]. 
220 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 41. 
221 Id. at 42–45. 
222 Id. at 44–45. 
223 Amiti et. al., supra note 164, at 199–200. 
224 See Michael E. Waugh, The Consumption Response to Trade Shocks: 
Evidence From the US-China Trade War, at 4 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., 
Working Paper No. 26353, 2019), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working 
_papers/w26353/w26353.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q77B-RUXJ]. 
225 See id. at 2. 
226 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 3. 
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side.227 In other words, the logic of power-based bargaining only 
ever had the potential to work if China had not adopted a trig-
ger strategy in response to the increase in U.S. tariffs.228
 As a precursor to later discussion of the estimated political 
costs of the Administration’s adoption of power-based bargaining, 
it is also worth summarizing Fajgelbaum et al.’s findings on the 
U.S. regional economic effects of the trade war. As previously 
noted, tariffs affect consumers through higher prices, but workers 
in the protected import-competing sectors may also benefit from 
higher producer and export prices.229 In addition, U.S. tariffs 
were heavily targeted towards imports of intermediate inputs which 
may be used more intensively in some regions compared to oth-
ers.230 Any regional effects of U.S. import tariffs will also have 
been affected by the regional structure of retaliatory tariffs.231
 In order to analyze regional effects, Fajgelbaum et al. uti-
lized annual industry employment and wage data at the county-by-
sector level for all nonfarm sectors, collected from the Census 
Bureau County Business Patterns (CBP) database, while county-
level data for the farm sector were collected from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) Local Area Personal Income and Em-
ployment database.232 In addition, county-level demographic sta-
tistics were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau American 
Community Survey, and county-level voting data were collected 
from the U.S. Federal Election Commission.233
 Several key results come out of the regional analysis.234
First, there is considerable variation across counties in their 
227 Id. The argument here is as follows: when the U.S. imposes tariffs on a 
range of products, U.S. consumers reallocate consumption to the U.S. versions of 
these products. Id. at 42. The net effect is to raise world demand for the U.S. 
version of the products relative to world demand for the Chinese version of 
the products, resulting in a terms-of-trade benefit to U.S. producers. Id.
228 See id. at 4. 
229 See id. at 45–49. 
230 See Thiemo Fetzer & Carlo Schwarz, Tariffs and Politics: Evidence 
from Trumps’ Trade Wars, at 1 (CEPR, Discussion Paper No. 13579, 2019). 
The authors find that the geographic incidence of the 2018 tariffs correlated 
with the Republican’s prior electoral performance. Id. at 7. 
231 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 46–47. 
232 Id. at 8. 
233 See id.
234 See id. at 45–52. 
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exposure to the trade war, with the Great Lakes region of the 
Midwest and industrial areas of the Northeast receiving higher 
tariff protection, while rural areas in the Midwestern plains and 
Mountain West were subject to higher tariff retaliation.235 Second, 
every county in the U.S. suffered a reduction in its real wage, 
the counties with lower losses being in the Rust Belt and South-
east, while counties in the Midwestern Plains were hit with the 
largest reductions in real wages due to the structure of retalia-
tory tariffs.236 Third, there is evidence that the Administration 
targeted tariffs at politically competitive counties, with a view to 
disproportionately affecting those voters important in determin-
ing electoral outcomes.237 Specifically, counties with a 40–60 
percent Republican vote were targeted with higher tariffs than 
counties that leaned heavily to either the Republicans or Demo-
crats.238 In terms of economic impact, workers located in counties 
where the Republican vote share was 85–95 percent incurred the 
greatest cost due to the trade war.239 Reinforcing this, Waugh’s 
analysis shows that the consumption impact of U.S. trade policy 
varied regionally, with high-tariff counties experiencing larger 
declines in automobile sales relative to low-tariff counties.240
C. The Impact of Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Agriculture 
 Given the recorded negative effect of the trade war on 
counties in the Midwestern plains, and the importance of the rural 
and farm sector to Donald Trump’s political base, it is important 
to dig a little deeper into the extent to which the U.S. agricultur-
al sector was disproportionately affected by retaliation to U.S. im-
plementation of tariffs in 2018. The most detailed analysis of the 
effect of this retaliation is provided by agricultural economists 
Colin Carter and Sandro Steinbach.241 In their study, they used 
235 See id. at 45–47. 
236 See id. at 47–49. 
237 See id. at 49. 
238 See id. See also Protection for Sale, supra note 169, at 1239–40. 
239 Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 51. 
240 See Waugh, supra note 224, at 2. 
241 See Colin A. Carter & Sandro Steinbach, The Impact of Retaliatory Tar-
iffs on Agricultural and Food Trade, at 1–47 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., 
Working Paper No. 27147, 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27147 [https:// 
perma.cc/EXU3-LAXB]. 
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a monthly panel dataset of tariffs targeted against U.S. products 
at the HTSUS-8 and HTSUS-10-digit levels, collected from the 
finance and trade ministries of Canada, China, the EU, India, 
Mexico, Russia, and Turkey.242 These tariff data were matched with 
U.S. export data from the Global Trade Atlas.243 The data indi-
cate that average tariffs on U.S. agricultural products increased 
from 8.3 to 28.6 percent on 908 products accounting for $32 bil-
lion worth of U.S. exports.244 Retaliatory tariffs disproportionately 
affected agricultural products compared to other sectors, and the 
tariff increases were also steeper, the average ad valorem tariff 
increasing from 8.3 to 28.6 percent.245 Notably, the most signifi-
cant retaliation was by China, who imposed tariffs on $25.5 bil-
lion of U.S. imports.246
 In their empirical analysis, Carter and Steinbach also used 
an “event” study to identify the impact of the retaliatory tariffs 
on U.S. agricultural exports, based on exploiting differences in 
export quantities, values, and unit values between targeted and 
non-targeted products over time.247 Their reported results indi-
cate that retaliatory tariffs had a significant impact on agricultural 
trade.248 First, the United States saw a 55 percent reduction in its 
exports to retaliating countries worth -$15.6 billion (trade destruc-
tion), which was only partially offset by a 0.8 percent increase in 
exports worth $1.2 billion to countries that did not implement 
tariffs (trade deflection), i.e., net destruction of U.S. agricultural 
exports was -$14.4 billion.249 Second, non-retaliating countries 
experienced a 31 percent expansion of their exports to retaliating 
countries worth $13.5 billion (trade diversion).250 These effects were 
also very concentrated at the product level, with trade destruction 
and trade diversion being particularly significant for soybeans 
at -$7.1 billion and $3.7 billion, respectively, and trade in pork 
products and coarse grains such as corn also being affected.251
242 See id. at 7. 
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Overall, U.S. exporters appeared to have had difficulty in adapt-
ing their supply chains to non-retaliating countries, while other 
exporting countries were able to increase their market share in 
retaliating countries at the expense of the U.S.252
 Sheldon and Grant253 have shown China had a significant 
impact on the extent of agricultural trade destruction and diver-
sion.254 In their empirical analysis, a comparison is made between 
the monthly values of combined exports to China by the EU28, 
Brazil and Argentina, and Australia and New Zealand, to the 
monthly value of U.S. exports to China for the 2016/17 and 
2018/19 agricultural marketing years (September–August).255
While trade diversion to these countries was not a one-to-one 
displacement of what is normally the U.S.’s peak export market-
ing period, the data show clearly the shift in sourcing of China’s 
imports as the trade war escalated.256 In January 2019, China 
imported 2.6 times ($7.1 billion total) more from these competing 
suppliers as compared to January 2017.257 Trade destruction, 
measured by the loss of U.S. market share in China, was partic-
ularly significant for U.S. exports of soybeans, the value of which 
fell from $12.2 to $4.5 billion over the period 2017–19.258 Brazil 
benefited the most from trade diversion, soybean exports to China 
initially increasing from $20.3 billion in 2017 to $27.3 billion in 
2018, before falling back in 2019 to $20.5 billion following China’s 
outbreak of African Swine Fever in late 2018.259
 As already discussed, tariff increases by a large country 
such as China usually depress world prices, resulting in a trans-
fer from exporting to importing country(ies).260 This was certainly 
the case with China’s retaliatory tariff of 25 percent imposed on 
imports of U.S. soybeans, and it is hard to over-emphasize the 
252 See id.
253 IAN M. SHELDON & JASON GRANT, CAST COMMENTARY, GLOBAL TRADE 
IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS THE LIKELY IMPACT OF COVID-19, at 7 (2020), https:// 
aede.osu.edu/sites/aede/files/imce/images/QTA2020-3-COVID-Impacts.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PZT8-9CTK]. 
254 See id. at 5–9. 
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economic and political importance of soybean production and ex-
ports to the U.S. agricultural sector.261 Prior to the start of the 
trade war, the United States exported $23.8 billion worth of soy-
beans, two and a half times greater than its exports of corn.262
Under normal trading conditions, the United States would export 
approximately 50 percent of the soybeans it produced, with over 
half of those exports going to China, e.g., in the 2016/17 market-
ing year, the United States exported 36 million metric tons (MMT) 
of soybeans to China, 61 percent of total soybean exports—about 
one in three rows of harvested soybeans.263 Compared to average 
soybean exports to China of 31 MMT over the three marketing 
years prior to 2018/19, U.S. exports fell by 65 percent after im-
plementation of the tariff.264 Given the modest increase in U.S. 
soybean exports to other countries such as Argentina, the EU, and 
Egypt, U.S. soybean exports fell overall by 10.4 MMT in 2018/19.265
 Combined with a strong harvest in 2018 and the loss of 
market share to Brazil, the United States saw a significant de-
cline in cash prices received by U.S. soybean farmers in the 
2018/19 marketing year.266 In many parts of the agricultural 
producing regions of the United States, there was a weakening 
of the “basis”, i.e., the difference between what farmers are paid 
at their local elevator and the nearest futures price listed on the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).267 The basis is a function of 
multiple factors, including, yields at harvest, transport costs, 
crop quality, seasonality, and the extent and cost of storage.268
Given that the Chinese tariff displaced a significant proportion 
of U.S. soybean exports, this put downward pressure on the cash 
prices offered by the major commodity handling firms, which re-
sulted in weakening of the basis.269 By the beginning of September 
261 Michael K. Adjemian et al., Tariff Retaliation Weakened the U.S. Soybean 
Basis, 34 CHOICES 1 (2019), https://www.choicesmagazine.org/UserFiles/file 
/cmsarticle_722.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ABD-8S9G]. 
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2018, U.S. soybean producers were being quoted an average cash 
price of 95 cents/bushel below the futures contract for delivery 
that November, 30 cents/bushel lower than the previous year.270
 In addition, with exports to China from U.S. ports on the 
Pacific coast falling by 94 percent in the second half of 2018, 
there was a significant spatial effect on cash prices received by 
soybean farmers in the upper Midwest, a region that lacks soy-
bean crushing capacity and experiences high transport costs to 
alternative ports on the Gulf.271 In addition, farm financial con-
straints and a lack of on-farm storage forced many farmers to sell 
their soybean crop at lower cash prices.272 For example, by the end 
of September 2018, the average cash price of soybeans in North 
Dakota was over $2/bushel below the November futures price, a 
dollar less than the price offered the year before.273 This confirms 
the empirical findings of Cavallo et al. reported earlier that there 
was imperfect passthrough of tariffs to Chinese import prices for 
agricultural commodities, i.e., U.S. soybean farmers bore a sig-
nificant incidence of these tariffs.274
D. U.S. Agriculture and the U.S.-China Trade Agreement 
 Due to its political influence in the U.S., it is not surpris-
ing that agriculture was a critical component of Phase I of the 
USCTA that went into effect on January 14, 2020.275 Specifically, 
China committed to purchasing an additional $12.5 and $19.5 
billion worth of U.S. agricultural products above 2017 levels in 
2020 and 2021, respectively, implying total agricultural imports 
of $36.5 billion in 2020 and $43.5 billion in 2021.276 Essentially, 
these commitments by China constitute a voluntary import ex-
pansion (VIE), harking back to the era of managed trade be-
tween the United States and Japan in the 1980s.277
270 Id. at 3. 
271 Id. at 4. 
272 See id.
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 As a trade policy instrument, VIEs have rarely been used 
by policymakers and are not even covered by typical undergradu-
ate textbooks in international economics.278 In principle, a Chinese 
agricultural VIE would work as follows: the targeted level of im-
ports results in China’s import demand curve shifting out, driv-
ing up the price received by U.S. exporters, and at the same 
time, driving down the internal Chinese price, in order that its 
market can clear.279 In other words, in the absence of an import 
subsidy from the Chinese government, agricultural commodity 
traders operating in China will incur a loss as they will have to 
sell the mandated extra imports at a loss.280 Part of this loss is 
transferred to Chinese consumers who benefit from lower prices, 
and part is transferred to U.S. exporters in the form of higher 
prices, the remainder being the deadweight loss due to ineffi-
cient U.S. production and Chinese consumption.281
 In research reported by Robert Feenstra and Chang Hong, 
it has been calculated that, depending on a range of forecasts for 
Chinese economic growth, the gap between prices paid to U.S. 
exporters at the Chinese border and the price importers can charge 
Chinese consumers would require import subsidies paid by the 
Chinese government in the range 12–23 percent for 2020, and 42–
59 percent in 2021, in order that Chinese commodity traders could 
break even.282 This would represent a significant distortion to 
international agricultural commodity markets, with trade diversion 
to U.S. exporters away from other exporting countries, including 
Australia, Brazil, and Canada.283
Working Paper No. 20-4, 2020), https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents 
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 Of course, these are implicit import subsidies, the only re-
alistic way for China to meet their agricultural import commit-
ments being through mandates to SOEs such as the China Oil 
and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO).284 However, as a practical 
matter, two interdependent factors militate against relying on 
SOEs to satisfy the import targets. First, private trading firms 
are mostly responsible for purchasing Chinese agricultural im-
ports, for example, in 2015, accounting for 72, 69, and 92 percent 
of Chinese imports of soybeans, cotton, and meat products, re-
spectively.285 Second, despite the USCTA, China has not reduced 
its retaliatory tariffs against U.S. imports, therefore, private trading 
firms will have an incentive to purchase commodities from the 
world market at lower prices, thereby undermining the VIE.286
 Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, many observers 
suggested that meeting such agricultural import growth targets 
would be difficult.287 Based on China’s growth rate prior to the 
pandemic, it has been predicted that by 2021, there will be a 
shortfall of $10.5 billion in imports from the United States rela-
tive to the target, and based on a declining trend projection, the 
shortfall will be even larger at $23.6 billion.288 This expected 
shortfall has already been borne out in the January–May 2020 
China Customs Statistics.289 While improving on 2019 totals at 
284 See Chad P. Bown & Mary E. Lovely, Trump’s Phase One Deal Relies on 
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the height of the trade war, 2020 January–May totals of $7.5 billion 
suggest Chinese agricultural imports from the United States are 
running at 50 percent below the Agreement’s year-to-date target.290
In light of the COVID-19 pandemic shock to the global economy, 
the WTO’s forecast for China’s real GDP growth in 2020 of -4.0 to -
9.9 percent291 makes it seem very unlikely China will meet its 
import commitments under the USCTA, and even if it were able 
to do so, it would imply significant distortion to agricultural trade. 
E. Domestic Political Effects of the U.S.-China Trade War 
1. Trade Liberalization and Economic Nationalism 
 In evaluating the impact of the U.S.-China trade war on 
U.S. political outcomes, it is important to understand how Chi-
nese import penetration prior to the financial crisis was a factor 
in pushing U.S. politics towards overt economic nationalism.292
Trade liberalization in the post-war period has created both winners 
and losers in the United States, i.e., consumers and resources em-
ployed in the export-competing sectors have gained while resources 
such as less-skilled labor employed in the import-competing sec-
tors have suffered the costs of job displacement and reduced in-
comes.293 From the perspective of cost-benefit analysis, it is 
straightforward to demonstrate the gains from trade by appeal-
ing to the so-called Kaldor-Hicks compensation principle. Specif-
ically, as long as benefits of trade liberalization outweigh the 
losses, in principle it is possible for the winners to compensate 
the losers and still be better off, in other words, there is the po-
tential for a Pareto improvement whereby some agents in the 
U.S. economy are made better off without the remaining agents 
being made any worse off.294
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291 See Eddy Bekkers et al., Methodology for the WTO Trade Forecast of 
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 The obvious problem with this principle is highlighted when 
compensation of losers is either insufficient or does not actually 
occur.295 This creates the potential for populism to gain ground, 
the political outcome being economic nationalism, that is, opposi-
tion to free trade and increased isolationism, and a strong nation-
alist stance.296 As redistribution policies have either become less 
feasible or more costly, the mechanism for compensating losers from 
trade liberalization switches to protectionism.297 This also gets 
wrapped up in a political narrative of authoritarian nationalism 
drawing on populist grievances.298
 Populism can be defined as a political movement that involves 
a combination, but not necessarily all, of anti-elitism, authoritarian-
ism and nativism, as well as opposition to trade liberalization.299
A key to populism is that society is seen as being divided into 
two groups: the people and the elite, the latter controlling gov-
ernment, business and the financial sector, who are perceived as 
not acting in the best interests of the people.300 This idea was 
clearly captured in speeches made by Donald Trump both before 
and after his election as U.S. president.301 Populists believe that 
only they represent the “true people,” and as a consequence some 
set of voting citizens can be convinced to reject the “moral legit-
imacy” of the elite.302
 Trade economists Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman 
argue that populism is a specific form of “identity politics,” such 
295 See Italo Colantone & Piero Stanig, The Trade Origins of Economic Na-
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that voters’ preferences over trade policy reflect both their economic 
self-interest as well as their concerns for the groups in society 
with whom they identify.303 The authors then posit a “populist 
revolution” driven by a significant external event such as the 
China import shock to the U.S. economy, which widens the income 
distribution.304 As a result, less-skilled workers reject the legiti-
macy of the elites and, instead, see the nation as synonymous with 
their type.305 From this, they show how a dramatic rise in popu-
lism could lead to a substantive shift in a country’s trade policy 
towards protectionism.306 The political-economic outcome is one 
where a political party running on a populist platform imple-
ments a discrete jump in tariffs imposed on imported goods.307
 There is now a growing body of research examining the 
impact of the China import shock on U.S. employment and other 
metrics.308 For example, Justin Pierce and David Schott have 
shown that U.S. extension of permanent normal trade relations 
(PNTR) to China in 2000 in anticipation of China’s entry into the 
GATT/WTO in 2001 was associated with a sharp drop in U.S. 
manufacturing employment between 2000 and 2003, the effect 
being stronger in industries most affected by a reduction in un-
certainty about tariff rates.309 Other researchers have found a link 
between the China import shock and a wider range of economic 
and social issues, including crime rates,310 increases in household 
303 See Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Identity Politics and 
Trade Policy 1–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25348, 
2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25348/w25348.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4D2R-J5R8].
304 See id. at 28. 
305 See id. at 17. 
306 See id. at 28. 
307 See id. at 17–20. 
308 See Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott, The Costs of U.S. Trade Liberal-
isation with China Have Been Acute for Some Workers, at 13–17, in MEREDITH A.
CROWLEY, TRADE WAR: THE CLASH OF ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ENDANGERING GLOBAL 
PROSPERITY (2019) (ebook), https://voxeu.org/content/trade-war-clash-economic 
-systems-threatening-global-prosperity [https://perma.cc/93FJ-X74D]. 
309 See Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott, The Surprisingly Swift Decline 
of US Manufacturing Employment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 1632, 1632–35 (2016). 
310 See Yi Che & Xun Xu, The China Syndrome in US: Import Competition, 
Crime, and Government Transfer 1–4 (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Working 
Paper No. 68135, 2015), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68135/2/MPRA_paper 
_68135.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP39-M4NV]. 
2021] UNDERSTANDING TRUMP’S CHINA TARIFFS 317 
debt,311 declines in marriage rates,312 and increased death from 
drug overdoses.313
 Probably the most significant insights into the domestic 
consequences of the China “shock” are associated with David Autor 
and colleagues in a series of articles.314 Their work on the U.S. 
measures the geographic exposure of labor markets across the 
United States to the increase in imports from China.315 The 
“shock” feature of Chinese imports relates to the rapid rise pri-
marily in manufacturing imports from China up to 2007.316 The 
rising international competitiveness of China has been associated 
with increased openness in China that allowed Western firms to 
outsource production activities to China, the relaxation of cen-
tral planning, the accession to the WTO in 2001, and the possi-
ble manipulation of their exchange rate.317 Not only has the rise 
in China’s competitiveness given rise to concerns about “unfair” 
trade, but the extent and speed of the rise in imports from China 
forced considerable adjustment in the United States with the 
resulting impact on regional labor markets where manufactur-
ing activities are located.318
 Due to labor immobility in the U.S., the impact of Chinese 
imports was particularly strong across certain U.S. states: wages 
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fell dramatically, women withdrew from the workforce, there was 
an increase in demand for social benefits and disability allow-
ances, and when workers were re-engaged in the same locality, 
rehiring was at wages much lower than previous employment.319
This was the main feature of the China import shock: the geog-
raphy was felt dramatically in several, typically southern and 
eastern, states, whereas other states escaped the impact of the 
rise of China given the differences in industrial structure.320 In 
sum, looking beyond the aggregate of “national” welfare, the rapid 
growth of China had a significant impact on certain parts of the 
United States.321
 How did the China “shock” affect polarization of U.S. vot-
ing patterns? Autor et al. address this issue by extending their 
analysis of the China “shock” to an examination of voting pat-
terns across the United States.322 Using detailed data on voting 
in congressional and presidential elections, they report two main 
results. First, while accounting for other determinants of voting 
patterns, for example, education, age, white collar et cetera, due 
to the dramatic rise in imports from China, voters were less likely 
to support moderate candidates of either main political party.323
There was a swing to either end of the political spectrum reflect-
ing an increase in polarization in the U.S. political environ-
ment.324 Second, in presidential elections, in the districts most 
exposed to competition from Chinese imports, there was an in-
crease in support for Republican candidates.325 Although there 
may be other factors that have contributed to the divisiveness of 
U.S. politics in recent years, these authors have established a 
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Polarization], https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22637/w22 
637.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JFC-S8HQ]; see also Yi Che et al., Does Trade Lib-
eralization with China Influence U.S. Elections?, at 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Rsch., Working Paper No. 22178, 2016), https://www.nber.org/system/files 
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clear link between trade liberalization and political outcomes, which 
ties closely with the “America First” slogan and the targeting of 
tariffs by President Trump.326 As Autor et al. point out, both 
presidential candidates in 2016 explicitly highlighted competi-
tion from China in their electoral campaigns, the results here 
suggesting that the competition from China favored the Repub-
lican candidate.327
2. The Trade War and U.S. Voting Behavior 
 As described in a series of articles by Chad Bown and co-
authors, the Administration’s approach to trade policy has also 
been driven by: first, a broad range of technical and legal con-
cerns about Chinese industrial policy, including the role of SOEs 
and subsidies, theft of intellectual property, and forcible acquisi-
tion of technology;328 second, the inability of GATT/WTO rules to 
effectively address such policy concerns, especially China’s use of 
subsidies;329 and, third, broader concerns about the WTO dispute 
settlement system, notably perceived judicial overreach by the 
Appellate Body.330
 However, given President Trump’s anti-China rhetoric and 
the outcome of the 2016 election, it is not surprising that his admin-
istration chose to follow a strategy of power-based bargaining in 
the form of higher tariffs against China, as opposed to seeking a 
broad coalition with other countries to pursue a case against 
China at the WTO.331 The previous discussion of the evidence 
326 See Che et al., supra note 322, at 18. 
327 See id. at 43. 
328 See Bown, supra note 28, at 20. 
329 See Chad P. Bown & Jennifer A. Hillman, WTOing a Resolution to the 
China Subsidy Problem, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 557, 558–59 (2019). 
330 See Bown & Keynes, supra note 277, at 11–13; USTR POLICY AGENDA &
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 27–28. See also infra text accompanying 
note 331. 
331 See The Best Way to Address China’s Unfair Policies and Practices Is 
Through a Big, Bold Multilateral Case at the WTO: Hearing on U.S. Tools to 
Address Chinese Market Distortions Before the U.S.-China Econ. and Rev. 
Sec. Comm’n, 115th Cong. 1–2 (2018) (statement of Jennifer Hillman, Profes-
sor, Geo. Univ. L. Ctr.), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Hillman%20 
Testimony%20US%20China%20Comm%20w%20Appendix%20A.pdf?mod=ar 
ticle_inline [https://perma.cc/GJ6N-HLP4]; see also Robert Z. Lawrence, How 
the United States Should Confront China Without Threatening the Global Trading 
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presented in Fajgelbaum et al. suggests that tariffs were targeted 
for maximum electoral impact,332 which leads to a natural question: 
did the trade war affect the outcome of the 2018 midterm elections? 
 The available empirical evidence suggests the answer to 
this question is that it did.333 The most detailed analysis has 
been conducted by economists Emily Blanchard, Chad Bown, 
and Davin Chor.334 The focus of their statistical analysis is on 
the relationship between U.S. voting patterns and county-level 
policy exposure, the latter being measured by the extent to which 
counties were protected by tariffs on U.S. imports, the extent to 
which they were affected by retaliatory tariffs on U.S. exports, 
and the degree to which they stood to gain from subsidies ex-
tended to farmers under the 2018 Market Facilitation Program 
(MFP).335 The latter policy was put in place in response to tariffs 
placed on U.S. agricultural exports.336 In addition, their analysis 
also controls for the extent to which local health insurance cov-
erage was at risk from repeal of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).337
 Using data from David Leip’s U.S. Election Atlas, the au-
thors constructed a dependent variable measuring the county-level 
vote share received by Republican candidates for each of the 
2012–2018 elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, plus 
the 2016 Presidential election.338 The voting pattern variable is 
then related to a series of independent variables: 
(1) Import tariff shocks were defined as a county’s average 
per-worker exposure to increased U.S. tariffs, measured at the 
HTSUS 8 digit level, and the retaliatory tariff shock was defined 
as per-worker exposure to retaliatory tariffs by Canada, China, 
the EU, and Mexico.339 These tariff increases were combined 
with initial bilateral trade volumes by industry and country, 
System, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 6 (2018), https://www.piie.com/sys 
tem/files/documents/pb18-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/S63P-2XPU]. 
332 See Fajgelbaum et al., supra note 48, at 49–52. 
333 See Emily J. Blanchard et al., Did Trump’s Trade War Impact the 2018 
Election? 1–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26434, 2019), 
https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/wp19-21.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/N6E7-PBHU]. 
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which were then mapped into a measure of a county’s share of 
national employment in a specific industry using the 2016 
U.S. County Business Patterns.340
(2) Given MFP, which in 2018 consisted of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) administering the payment of 
$12 billion in subsidies to producers of soybeans, sorghum, 
corn, wheat and some other commodities, a variable was con-
structed to measure the total farm subsidy received by a 
county weighted by its working age population.341
(3) Two county-level healthcare variables were constructed 
based on the U.S. Census Bureau American Community Sur-
vey, one measuring the share of the population having health 
insurance just prior to the 2018 mid-term election, and a sec-
ond measuring the change in the share of those having health 
insurance since ACA came into effect in 2010.342
(4) A set of county-level demographic (age, gender, and race) 
and socioeconomic (employment shares, unemployment rate, 
mean income, education) control variables were used, drawing 
on the U.S. Census, the County Business Patterns dataset, 
and the U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey.343
 The key econometric result reported in this study was 
that greater local exposure to the economic impact of the trade 
war was associated with a decline in support and loss of seats in 
the House of Representatives for Republican candidates in the 
2018 midterm elections.344 Importantly, this result was mostly a 
function of the extent to which a county was affected by the re-
taliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural exports, especially to China, 
most notably in counties where Trump had narrowly lost the 
popular vote in the 2016 Presidential election.345 The agricultural 
subsidies offered by the MFP partially offset the decline in Re-
publican vote share, but due to the concentrated set of counties 
where these were targeted, they had no significant effect on the 
swing in seats.346 In addition, the results were statistically ro-
bust to inclusion of healthcare variables.347
340 See id. at 20–21. The trade data come from the World Bank WITS database. 
341 Blanchard et al., supra note 333, at 22. The MFP subsidy rates are 
drawn from the Congressional Research Service, while county-level commodity 
production comes from USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). 
342 See Blanchard et al., supra note 333, at 8–9. 
343 See id. at 9. 
344 See id. at 18. 
345 See id. at 18. 
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 The political impact of retaliatory tariffs against U.S. ag-
ricultural exports, particularly soybeans, also shows up in the 
research of political scientists Olga Chyzh and Robert Urbatsch.348
In their empirical analysis, they analyzed the impact of a coun-
ty’s reliance on soybean production on the change in the Repub-
lican vote share in the 2016 and 2018 elections to the House of 
Representatives.349 The latter variable was constructed as an 
odds ratio of Republican-to-Democrat county-level votes between 
the two elections, based on data collected from Secretaries of 
State or equivalents,350 while the former variable was measured 
in both soybean bushels and value of soybean sales, using 2012 
data from USDA.351 In addition, other control variables included 
county-level GDP per capita, unemployment, education, urbani-
zation, ethnicity, and percent of population who voted for Donald 
Trump in the 2016 Presidential election.352 The latter data were 
drawn from the BEA and U.S. Census Bureau American Com-
munity Survey, and the Cook Political Report’s Partisan Voting 
Index.353 The key econometric result of this study is that there 
was a direct negative relationship between a county’s economic 
reliance on soybean production and the decrease in Republican 
vote share between 2016 and 2018.354
 This empirical research adds another dimension to the 
argument that the Trump Administration’s choice of power-based 
bargaining over trade policy was rather short-sighted, generating 
a whole sequence of unintended consequences. Not only has the 
resulting trade war inflicted economic damage on the U.S. econ-
omy, but at the local level the economic damage has also resulted 
in political damage to the incumbent political party.355 Notwith-
standing the fact that the China import shock resulted in greater 
348 See Olga Chyzh & Robert B. Urbatsch, Bean Counters: The Effect of Soy 
Tariffs on Change in Republican Vote Share Between the 2016 and 2018 Elec-
tions, at 1–16 (Digital Repository Iowa State University, 2019), https://lib 
.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=pols_pubs. [https:// 
perma.cc/CQ5S-7NEZ]. 
349 See id. at 2. 
350 See id. at 4–5. 
351 See id. at 6–7. 
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political polarization in the United States, and concomitant sup-
port for nationalist and protectionist trade policies, the use of 
tariffs by the Administration appears to have backfired.356 Im-
portantly, retaliating countries such as China, in specifically 
targeting U.S. agricultural exports, seem to have neutralized any 
potential political benefits from protecting some sectors of the 
U.S. economy.357
 In this context, it is not surprising that President Trump 
has placed so much public emphasis on the Phase I of USCTA, 
and China’s commitment to substantially increasing their agri-
cultural imports from the United States in 2020 and 2021.358
However, the potential for extensive trade diversion due to the 
USCTA runs the risk of negatively affected exporting countries 
such as Brazil filing a complaint at the WTO.359 In addition, the 
subsidies targeted at U.S. farmers through the MFP program, 
designed to cushion them from the effects of retaliatory tariffs, could 
find the United States being in breach of the WTO’s Agreement 
on Agriculture (AoA).360 Under the AoA, the United States has 
committed to not spending more than $19.1 billion per year on 
trade-distorting farm subsidies, but analysis by the Environmental 
Working Group (EWG) indicates federal farm payments for the 
2018/19 crop year will reach $34 billion, 78 percent above the 
cap, with payments in the 2019/20 crop year also likely to exceed 
the cap.361 Australia, Brazil, Canada, the EU, and New Zealand 
have already complained that U.S. farm subsidies are in breach 
of the AoA.362 With the crippling of the WTO dispute settlement 
356 See id.
357 See Fetzer & Schwarz, supra note 230, at 5–6. These authors present 
empirical evidence that targeted retaliation by China and other countries has been 
effective, Republican candidates faring worse in the 2018 midterm elections. 
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system, there is a very real risk that members such as the EU 
will unilaterally retaliate with tit-for-tat farm subsidies, creating a 
new front in the trade war.363
CONCLUSION
 The United States’ power-based approach to trade has 
achieved some notable successes in the legal arena of interna-
tional trade.364 The United States was able to decommission the 
WTO Appellate Body and to immunize itself from legal chal-
lenges to its acts in defiance of WTO law.365 These actions create 
the legal conditions for the use by the United States of a unilat-
eral approach to trade.366 In the area of economics and politics, 
however, the U.S. power-based approach has achieved mixed re-
sults, due to the unpredictable and uncertain variables involved 
in these areas.367
 This study indicates that the U.S. power-based approach 
to China has led to some negative economic and political effects 
on the United States. In particular, contrary to the assertion by 
the Trump Administration, the empirical evidence indicates un-
equivocally that tariffs imposed on China are not paid for by 
China but constitute a tax on U.S. consumers in the amount of 
$51 billion and a net loss of $7.3 billion to the U.S. economy.368
This evidence suggests that the most effective use of a power-based 
approach may be against countries that lack the political will or 
economic power to engage the United States in a prolonged 
trade war or standoff. For example, when faced with U.S. tariffs 
imposed on steel and aluminum imposed in 2018, South Korea 
immediately renegotiated the terms of the Korea–United States 
Trade Agreement (KORUS) and offered new trade concessions to 
the United States.369 South Korea agreed to limit its exports of 
steel to 2.68 tons or roughly 70 percent of the volume of steel ex-
ports from Korea to the United States for the years 2015–17.370
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The United States immediately declared that the concessions by 
South Korea vindicated its approach.371 Treasury Secretary Steve 
Mnuchin boasted, “I think the strategy has worked, quite frankly. 
We announced the tariff. We said we were going to proceed. But, 
again, we said we’d simultaneously negotiate.”372 Mnuchin claimed 
that South Korea’s concessions were a “win-win situation” for both 
countries.373 When faced with the same steel and aluminum tariffs, 
the EU also swiftly agreed to negotiations, leading the Trump Ad-
ministration to “declare a resounding victory for Trump and his 
confrontational stance.”374 Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross 
proclaimed, “[t]his is a real vindication of the president’s trade 
policy.”375 Unlike South Korea, the EU had the economic power 
to engage in a standoff with the United States, but it lacked the 
political will.376
 By contrast, China is a nation that has the economic power 
to fight a costly trade war. It is also a nation whose leaders, the 
Communist Party, cannot accept the perception of being bullied 
by the United States, but is willing to play a dangerous game of 
mutual destruction instead.377 This Article has indicated that 
the U.S.-China trade war was costly to the United States resulting 
in a heavy tax on U.S. consumers and losses of at least $7.3 bil-
lion in 2018 alone.378 The distribution of the costs of U.S. tariffs 
was also unexpected as it was not possible to determine beforehand 
that the costs would fall on areas of the United States that were 
vital to the political support of the current Administration.379
 China’s retaliatory tariffs greatly increased the uncertain-
ties of the costs of the trade war.380 China chose to impose tariffs 
in an area to cause maximum pain and distress: agricultural 
371 Id.
372 Id. at 26. 
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products and, in particular, U.S. soybean production.381 Coinci-
dentally, the farmers in Midwestern states most affected by the 
tariffs were a key constituency that helped propel Trump to the 
U.S. presidency in 2016.382 Although China’s imposition of tar-
iffs on U.S. imports would also inflict losses on its consumers, 
China was able to avoid many of these losses by finding alterna-
tive sources of soybeans from Brazil, and other countries.383 The 
loss of its major export markets for soybeans caused serious fi-
nancial losses for U.S. farmers in the Midwest that may have 
contributed to reverses for the Republican Party in the midterm 
elections of 2018.384
 As both political parties in the United States seem to har-
bor little affection for China and the WTO, it is far from certain 
that the United States will abandon its power-based approach to 
trade with China and other countries after the presidential elec-
tion of 2020, no matter who wins. It was the Democrat Admin-
istration of Barack Obama that set in motion the events that led 
to the crippling of the WTO dispute settlement system and the 
ascendance of the U.S. power-based approach in the legal arena 
of international trade dispute resolution.385
 The lessons gleaned from this Article suggest that a power-
based approach is most effective when the target of confrontation 
trade tactics lacks the economic power, such as South Korea, or 
the political will, such as the EU, to engage in a trade standoff 
with the United States.386 The United States may be able draw 
assurance from the knowledge that many, if not most, other na-
tions fall in either one of these two categories, but China is not 
one of them.387
 The benefits of using a power-based approach are far less 
certain and considerably riskier when faced with an opponent 
such as China. With such an opponent, the United States must 
carefully assess where the potential economic and political costs 
381 See id.
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will fall but the United States must be cautioned that it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to predict with accuracy the economic or 
political costs of such a battle. There are too many variables to 
make such a prediction certain and the power-based approach is 
inherently more unpredictable than the negotiation approach of 
the WTO that the United States rejects and seeks to replace. It 
already appears that the unanticipated economic and political 
costs of the China tariffs may have backfired in the 2018 mid-
term elections and that additional electoral losses might further 
ensue.388 The risks of using a power-based approach to trade are 
the highest when faced with a country such as China that has 
the economic power and political will to endure a prolonged bat-
tle and play a dangerous game of mutual pain and destruction 
with the United States. 
388 See Blanchard et al., supra note 333. 
